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COMPELLING IMAGES: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
EMOTIONALLY PERSUASIVE HEALTH CAMPAIGNS
NADIA N. SAWICKI
ABSTRACT
Legislation requiring the display of emotionally compelling
graphic imagery in medical and public health contexts is on the
rise—two examples include the Food and Drug Administration’s
recently abandoned tobacco labeling regulations, which would
have imposed images of diseased lungs and cancerous lesions on
cigarette packaging, and state laws requiring physicians to
display and describe ultrasound images to women seeking
abortions. This Article highlights the disconnect between the
constitutional challenges to these laws, which focus on the perils
of compelling speakers to communicate messages with which they
may disagree, and the public’s primary objections, which are
grounded in ethical concerns about the state’s reliance on
emotion to persuade.
This Article argues that, despite
inconsistent judicial precedent in the tobacco and ultrasound
contexts, concerns about the emotional impact of governmentmandated images on viewers can and should be incorporated in
First and Fourteenth Amendment analyses. In making this
argument, the Article relies on the body of First Amendment
jurisprudence in which the Supreme Court suggests that images
are uniquely dangerous because they are less rational, less
controllable, and more emotionally powerful than textual
communications.
Copyright © 2014 by Nadia N. Sawicki.
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INTRODUCTION
In order to achieve its policy objectives, the government must speak. 1
Because the success of its policies depends on how persuasively the state
communicates, policymakers and politicians have long sought ideas from
the worlds of advertising and communications to improve the salience of
government messages. As a result, governments frequently use graphic
images with emotional appeal—from highway posters featuring Smokey
Bear2 to video game-style recruiting campaigns for the United States Armed
Forces3—to persuade citizens to act in support of public goals.
This phenomenon is particularly striking in the realms of medicine and
public health. American public health campaigns have long relied on the
use of emotionally stirring graphic imagery to persuade the public. Early
examples include a 1919 poster from the American Red Cross featuring the
ghost of tuberculosis being pushed out of a home,4 and a 1944 United States
War Department venereal disease warning depicting an attractive woman as
“A Bag of Trouble.”5 Indeed, one could trace the history of American
public health using posters from the United States Public Health Service
alone.6 While this approach has traditionally been uncontroversial, two

1. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468 (2009) (“[I]t is not easy to
imagine how government could function if it lacked [the freedom to express its views].”); MARK
G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN
AMERICA 6 (1983) (describing the “transfer of information” as a “policy tool”); Joseph Blocher,
Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. REV. 695, 749–51 (2011) (discussing
government speech as a means to inform, persuade, and foster debate); David Cole, Beyond
Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 681 (1992) (“The citizenry has an interest in knowing the government’s point
of view, and the government has an interest in using speech to advance the programs and policies
it enacts.”).
2. Smokey Bear, the mascot of the United States Forest Service, has been used since 1944
to educate the public about the dangers of forest fires. Smokey Bear Campaign History, AD
COUNCIL, http://www.smokeybear.com/vault/history_main.asp (last visited Dec. 3, 2013).
3. The U.S. Army has developed a series of video games for potential recruits to experience
“what the Army has to offer without leaving your home—and have fun while doing it.”
Downloads: Games, U.S. ARMY, http://www.goarmy.com/downloads/games.html (last visited
Sept. 5, 2013). The U.S. Army also created a television commercial targeted at video game
players.
U.S.
Army
Commercial
Targeting
Video
Gamers,
YOUTUBE,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XkKF4ZcqW14 (last updated June 8, 2007).
4. Visual Culture and Public Health Posters: The Next to Go: Fight Tuberculosis, NAT’L
LIBRARY OF MED., http://www.nlm.nih.gov/exhibition/visualculture/infectious04.html (last
updated Sept. 8, 2011).
5. Visual Culture and Public Health Posters: She May Be a Bag of Trouble, NAT’L
LIBRARY OF MED., http://www.nlm.nih.gov/exhibition/visualculture/infectious18.html (last
updated Sept. 8, 2011).
6. See Visual Culture and Public Health Posters: Exhibition Introduction, NAT’L LIBRARY
OF MED., http://www.nlm.nih.gov/exhibition/visualculture/introduction.html (last updated Sept. 8,
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recent developments have brought the government’s use of graphic imagery
in medical and public health contexts to the forefront of public debate.
In 2011, the United States Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”)
adopted tobacco labeling regulations, which required manufacturers to
cover fifty percent or more of cigarette packaging with graphic images
depicting the negative health consequences of smoking; selected images
included photographs of diseased lungs, cancerous oral lesions, and
cadavers.7 Notably, the FDA selected these images precisely because of
their emotional impact, citing evidence that “messages that arouse
emotional reactions” or “generate an immediate emotional response” are
more likely to trigger behavioral changes.8 Tobacco manufacturers, suing
to enjoin enforcement of these laws, publicly objected that the mandated
warnings were inappropriate because they were “intended to elicit loathing,
disgust, and repulsion.”9
A second recent example of this phenomenon is the adoption of state
laws requiring that a woman seeking an abortion view an ultrasound of her
fetus and listen to her doctor’s description of the image before consenting to
the procedure.10 Policymakers have suggested that viewing the fetal
ultrasound will trigger maternal bonding instincts and feelings of love, in
turn inspiring women who might otherwise choose abortions to carry their
pregnancies to term.11 Critics, however, have challenged these laws as
taking advantage of women’s emotions to influence their private medical
decisions.12

2011) (revealing how public health posters can “provide an effective medium for communicating
information about disease, identifying risk factors, and promoting behavioral change”).
7. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628,
36,674 (June 22, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141).
8. Id. at 36,635.
9. Duff Wilson, U.S. Releases Graphic Images to Deter Smokers, N.Y. TIMES, June 21,
2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/22/health/policy/22smoke.html?_r=1&
(internal
quotation marks omitted).
10. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.2(D)(2)(b) (2008) (amended 2013)
(requiring physicians performing abortions to display real-time sonograms and provide “a
simultaneous and objectively accurate oral explanation of what the ultrasound is depicting” at
least twenty-four hours before performing abortion); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85(a) (2011)
(amended 2013) (requiring same); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-738.3d(B) (2010) (requiring same);
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(4) (West 2011) (requiring same).
11. Jennifer M. Keighley, Physician Speech and Mandatory Ultrasound Laws: The First
Amendment’s Limit on Compelled Ideological Speech, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2347, 2393–94
(2013) (quoting Texas Governor Rick Perry representing the Texas statute as a “critical step in our
efforts to protect life” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
12. See infra Part II.B.
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Both the tobacco and ultrasound laws have been challenged on First
Amendment grounds as unconstitutionally compelling speech.13 The
ultrasound laws, which continue to face judicial scrutiny, also face
Fourteenth Amendment challenges based on the right to reproductive
privacy.14 In both arenas, circuit splits have called attention to the
uncertainty surrounding the resolution of these important constitutional
issues.15 While the FDA recently declined to petition the Supreme Court
for review in the tobacco cases, suggesting that future rulemaking would
render the legal issues moot,16 the conflicting precedent in the ultrasound
context potentially puts this conflict in a position to reach the Supreme
Court.17
This Article makes a much needed interdisciplinary contribution to the
existing literature on this topic by demonstrating that the constitutional
challenges to these laws can be effectively bolstered by relying on wellestablished ethical arguments about the dangers of emotional and arational
persuasion,18 as well as scientific research suggesting that visual images
13. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (tobacco);
Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 521 (6th Cir. 2012) (tobacco);
Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 574 (5th Cir. 2012)
(abortion); Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 428 (M.D.N.C. 2011) (abortion), aff’d, 706 F. 3d
345 (4th Cir. 2013).
14. See Stuart, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 436; Nova Health Sys. v. Pruitt, 292 P.3d 28 (Okla. 2012)
(per curium) (holding that the Oklahoma Ultrasound Act is facially unconstitutional under
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey).
15. In the tobacco context, compare R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1222 (vacating
the graphic warning requirements as unconstitutional and remanding to the FDA), with Disc.
Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc., 674 F.3d at 531 (upholding constitutionality of graphic tobacco
warnings). In the ultrasound context, compare Lakey, 667 F.3d at 584 (vacating preliminary
injunction of the Texas ultrasound law), with Stuart, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 433 (granting preliminary
injunction of North Carolina law).
16. On October 26, 2012, tobacco companies petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari to resolve the circuit split. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d
509 (6th Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, 81 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 26, 2012) (No. 12-521).
After consultation with HHS and FDA, however, the Solicitor General decided not to seek
Supreme Court review of the First Amendment issues raised by the Plaintiff cigarette
manufacturers. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen., to John Boehner, Speaker of the
House
of
Representatives
(Mar.
15,
2013),
available
at
http://www.mainjustice.com/files/2013/03/Ltr-to-Speaker-re-Reynolds-v-FDA.pdf. On April 22,
2013, the Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v.
United States, 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub nom. Am. Snuff Co. v. United States,
133 S. Ct. 1996 (2013).
17. On November 12, 2013, the Supreme Court declined to review the Oklahoma Supreme
Court’s decision in Nova Health Systems v. Pruitt. See supra note 14. The contrasting decisions
of the Fifth Circuit in Lakey and the Middle District of North Carolina in Stuart, which was
affirmed by the Fourth Circuit, however, remain in conflict.
18. For a more thorough discussion of what constitute arational methods of persuasion, see
Nadia N. Sawicki, Ethical Limitations on the State’s Use of Arational Persuasion 6 (Loyola Univ.
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play an important role in triggering emotional responses.19 The Article first
highlights the substantial concerns that scholars of medical and public
health ethics have raised about the government’s use of emotionally
persuasive imagery to achieve its policy goals20—a normative objection
which has, to date, received little attention in legal literature.21 Second, the
Article looks to social science research demonstrating that vivid images are
more likely to trigger emotional responses than are verbal communications,
and argues that this empirical work about the connection between images,
emotions, and decisionmaking ultimately reinforces ethicists’ concerns
about emotional persuasion in image-based health campaigns.22
Taken together, these two lines of scholarship provide valuable
support to opponents of the tobacco and ultrasound campaigns. By drawing
on Supreme Court precedent about the power of images in First
Amendment law, as well as judicial commentary in the tobacco and
ultrasound cases, this Article argues that there are powerful reasons for
considering the emotional impact of the tobacco and ultrasound images as
relevant to their constitutionality.23 Further, it develops concrete arguments
that litigants can use to build concerns about emotion persuasion into
existing constitutional standards—including the tests for compelled
commercial speech in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Chicago
School
of
Law,
Research
Paper
No.
2013-004),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2286396.
19. See infra Part V.B.1.
20. See generally J. S. Blumenthal-Barby & Hadley Burroughs, Seeking Better Health Care
Outcomes: The Ethics of Using the “Nudge,” 12 AM. J. BIOETHICS 1, 1 (2012) (examining the
ethical considerations when behavioral economics and psychology are used to “nudge” people
toward making particular health decisions); Catherine Mills, Images and Emotion in Abortion
Debates, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 61, 61 (2008) [hereinafter Mills, Images and Emotion] (suggesting
that greater attention be made to the “emotive or affective impact of images on ethical intuitions”);
John Rossi & Michael Yudell, The Use of Persuasion in Public Health Communication: An
Ethical Critique, 5 PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 192, 193 (2012) (arguing that the use of persuasive
health communication “infringes upon autonomy, . . . leads to inadvertent harm, and . . . is
objectionable on principle”). For arguments raised in the abortion context in particular, see
CATHERINE MILLS, FUTURES OF REPRODUCTION: BIOETHICS AND BIOPOLITICS 102–03 (2011)
[hereinafter FUTURES OF REPRODUCTION] (exploring the effect of ultrasound on the experience of
pregnancy, and discussing the ethical implications of fetal imaging); Nick Hopkins et al.,
Visualising Abortion: Emotion Discourse and Fetal Imagery in a Contemporary Abortion Debate,
61 SOC. SCI. & MED. 393, 402 (2005) (arguing that it is “erroneous to depict the appearance of
emotion discourse in social movement rhetoric as evidencing an attempt to circumvent rational
deliberation”); Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, Fetal Images: The Power of Visual Culture in the
Politics of Reproduction, 13 FEMINIST STUD. 263, 265 (1987) (exploring the impact of ultrasound
imaging on consciousness of pregnant women and considering the implications of fetal images on
feminist theory and practice).
21. See infra Part V.A.
22. See infra Part V.B.1.
23. See infra Part V.
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Service Commission of New York24 and Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel;25 strict scrutiny of compelled personal speech;26 tests for
protecting captive audiences from unwanted speech;27 and Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey’s28 undue burden test
for protecting reproductive privacy.29 While recognizing that ethical claims
about the emotional impact of images may not ultimately trump utilitarian
concerns about the effectiveness of policy messages and the merits of these
policy goals, this Article concludes that when the government relies on
image-based emotional messaging to achieve its policy goals without
carefully considering its impact on viewers, important ethical
considerations are lost.30
Part II of the Article describes the two public health campaigns at
issue. It demonstrates that both the FDA’s tobacco labeling laws and state
abortion ultrasound requirements were passed to persuade behavior change
at least in part through emotional persuasion, and emphasizes that much of
the public criticism of these laws revolves around concerns about their
emotional impact.
Part III provides a fuller explanation of the objection to emotional
persuasion, defining it as the claim that, generally, those seeking to
persuade others—particularly those persuaders in positions of superior
power—ought to do so primarily on the basis of reasoned argument rather

24. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (establishing that a state may regulate commercial speech
where the “governmental interest is substantial,” the regulation at issue “directly advances the
governmental interest asserted,” and where the regulation “is not more extensive than is necessary
to serve that interest”).
25. 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (holding that the rights of commercial speakers “are adequately
protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State’s interest in
preventing deception of consumers”).
26. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713, 716 (1977) (holding that a state’s
interests must be “compelling” to “require an individual to participate in the dissemination of an
ideological message by displaying it on his private property,” especially when the end could be
more narrowly achieved).
27. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988) (“The First Amendment permits the
government to prohibit offensive speech as intrusive when the ‘captive’ audience cannot avoid the
objectionable speech.” ).
28. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
29. Id. at 877 (finding that pre-viability regulations of abortion do not violate a woman’s
Fourteenth Amendment right to reproductive privacy so long as they do not place substantial
obstacles in the path of the woman seeking abortion).
30. See also Sawicki, supra note 18, at 13. It is for this reason, also, that this Article does not
address the merits of the substantive policies the government is seeking to pursue. While
audiences may disagree as to whether reducing smoking rates and abortion rates are, as a general
matter, worthwhile goals for the state to pursue, the purpose of this Article is to bring to light
ethical concerns that are relevant regardless of one’s agreement or disagreement with the
substance of the message the state conveys.
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than by appealing to our basic instincts, stereotypes, or emotions. Reason
and emotion, of course, are not firm categories, but rather ends on the
spectrum of human decisionmaking. That said, the case for the primacy of
rational argument has a long-standing basis within the theories of
deliberative democracy, social psychology, communications ethics, and
medical ethics, and has been voiced by thinkers such as Aristotle, Immanuel
Kant, and Jürgen Habermas.
Part IV introduces the principles of First and Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence that federal courts have applied in the tobacco and ultrasound
contexts thus far—R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA31 and Discount
Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States32 (tobacco); and Stuart v.
Huff33 and Texas Medical Providers Performing Abortion Services v.
Lakey34 (ultrasound). It parses the precedential decisions on these topics
and highlights the few situations in which judicial decisionmakers have
responded to litigants’ concerns about emotional persuasion. There is,
unfortunately, no consistent precedent on this issue—only one court has
incorporated an objecting party’s concerns about the emotional impact of
compelled speech explicitly in its analysis,35 as have two judges in
dissenting or nonprecedential opinions.36
Finally, Part V uses the themes identified in the previous sections to
outline four methods by which concerns about emotionally persuasive
imagery might be brought into the constitutional analysis, and offers a
broader theoretical grounding for such a move by highlighting the unique
nature of images in constitutional doctrine.37 Relying on Amy Adler’s work

31. 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
32. 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012).
33. 834 F. Supp. 2d 424 (M.D.N.C. 2011), aff’d, 706 F. 3d 345 (4th Cir. 2013).
34. 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012).
35. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1216–17 (explaining that graphic tobacco
warnings “do not constitute . . . ‘purely factual and uncontroversial’ information” but are rather
“unabashed attempts to evoke emotion”).
36. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012) (Clay,
J., dissenting); Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, No. A-11-CA-486-SS,
2012 WL 373132 (W.D. Tex. 2012) (Sparks, J.).
37. See infra Part V.B.1–4 (arguing that (1) image-based messages communicated by the
state run the risk of violating First and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional tests requiring that
compelled communication be factual, truthful, non-misleading, and uncontroversial; (2)
campaigns that communicate factual messages more directly may be a more tailored means of
achieving government goals than relying on campaigns with image-based messaging; (3)
ultrasound image requirements that make it more difficult for a woman to exercise free choice
may run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections of reproductive privacy; and (4) imagebased emotional campaigns might violate the captive audience doctrine).
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on the First Amendment’s treatment of images,38 Part V argues that
Supreme Court precedent in a variety of contexts has often understood
image-based communications to be less rational, less controllable, more
emotionally powerful, and therefore potentially more dangerous than
words.
Litigants and public commentators in the tobacco and ultrasound
challenges have drawn attention to the emotional impact of the images that
are being communicated, via unwilling third parties, by the state.
Currently, however, there is an imperfect fit between these concerns and the
way in which courts have analyzed the constitutional issues. This Article
provides an interdisciplinary framework for drawing a tighter fit between
law, ethics, and social science—one that will hopefully guide litigants in the
cases currently winding their way toward the Supreme Court, as well as
policymakers considering such laws in the future.
II. THE EMOTIONAL RESONANCE OF IMAGE-BASED HEALTH CAMPAIGNS
Recently, the National Institutes of Health and the United States
National Library of Medicine collaborated in order to present a web-based
exhibition of public health campaigns throughout American history, titled
“Visual Culture and Public Health Posters.”39 The introduction to the
exhibit features a quote from William H. Helfland, consultant to the
National Library of Medicine and collector of medical ephemera: “Posters
have been a powerful force in shaping public opinion because
propagandists have long known that visual impressions are extremely
strong. People may forget a newspaper article but most remember a
picture.”40
The use of graphic and emotionally stirring imagery to encourage
citizens to make choices that the state believes are in the interest of public
health is by no means a historical phenomenon, however. Two recent
developments, described herein, have heightened public consciousness of
the state’s use of vivid imagery to persuade. Unlike their historical
counterparts, which were relatively uncontroversial, image-based
38. Amy Adler, The First Amendment and the Second Commandment, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 41 (2012).
39. Visual Culture and Public Health Posters, NAT’L LIBRARY OF MED.,
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/exhibition/visualculture/index.html (last updated July 10, 2012); see also
WORLD HEALTH ORG., PUBLIC HEALTH CAMPAIGNS: GETTING THE MESSAGE ACROSS (2009)
[hereinafter PUBLIC HEALTH CAMPAIGNS] (collecting post-WWI international public health
posters).
40. NAT’L LIBRARY OF MED., TO YOUR HEALTH: AN EXHIBITION OF POSTERS FOR
CONTEMPORARY
PUBLIC
HEALTH
ISSUES
14
(1990),
available
at
https://archive.org/stream/9400022.nlm.nih.gov/9400022#page/n1/mode/2up.
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campaigns in tobacco labeling and abortion informed consent have
encountered fierce opposition.
A. Graphic Tobacco Labeling
The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, passed in
2009, requires that the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services “issue regulations that require color graphics depicting the
negative health consequences of smoking” on tobacco packaging.41 In
2011, the FDA published a Final Rule,42 selecting nine graphic images for
inclusion on cigarette labeling, including images of:
a man exhaling cigarette smoke through a tracheotomy hole in his
throat; a plume of cigarette smoke enveloping an infant receiving
a kiss from his or her mother; a pair of diseased lungs next to a
pair of healthy lungs; a diseased mouth afflicted with what
appears to be cancerous lesions; a man breathing into an oxygen
mask; a bare-chested male cadaver lying on a table, and featuring
what appears to be post-autopsy chest staples down the middle of
his torso; a woman weeping uncontrollably; [] a man wearing a tshirt that features a ‘no smoking’ symbol and the words ‘I
QUIT’; . . . [and] a stylized cartoon . . . of a premature baby in an
incubator.43
These images were required to be placed on “at least 50 percent of the area
of the front and rear panels” of cigarette packaging as of September 22,
2012.44
The FDA selected these images and associated textual warnings
precisely because of their emotional impact. Citing evidence that messages
“generat[ing] an immediate emotional response” are more likely to trigger
behavioral changes,45 the FDA noted that the selected images “elicited
41. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 201(a), 123
Stat. 1776, 1845 (2009) (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C. 1333 (2010)).
42. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,628,
36,628 (June 22, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141).
43. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 823 F. Supp. 2d 36, 41–42 (D.D.C. 2011), vacated,
696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
44. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,674.
The FDA regulations comply with Article 11 of the WHO Framework on Tobacco Control, which
requires that tobacco packaging in signatory states carry health warnings that are “50% or more,
but no less than 30%, of the principal display areas.” Conference of the Parties, Guidelines for
Implementation of Article 11 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, at 3, WHO
FCTC/COP3(10) (2008). The United States signed the WHO Framework; however, it was not
sent to the Senate for ratification. Kevin Outterson, Smoking and the First Amendment, 365 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2351, 2353 (2011).
45. Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg. at 36,635.
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significant impacts on the [emotional and cognitive] salience measures” and
thus were more likely to cause consumers to change their behavior.46
Whether the FDA’s claims that graphic tobacco warnings help reduce
smoking rates are correct is, however, a matter of dispute. In its
rulemaking, the FDA cited numerous studies about the effects of graphic
health warnings in Canada, concluding that such warnings are “effective in
conveying the health risks of smoking, influencing consumer awareness of
these risks, and affecting smoking intentions.”47 In contrast, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in R.J.
Reynolds held that the evidence presented by the FDA did not support this
conclusion.48 Scholarly reviews of the evidence regarding the effectiveness
of antitobacco campaigns have likewise reached mixed or uncertain
results.49
Much of the public opposition to the new FDA regulations emphasizes
the emotional impact of the mandated graphic images. An article in Albany
Law Review about the new tobacco labels begins with the following
dramatic statement:
Picture this: the upper body of an anonymous man, cigarette in
hand, mouth parted in shame, as he exhales the ominous white
smoke of his relentless habit through the black tracheotomy in the
small of his neck. . . . Try to envision: lips pulled back to reveal a
crooked, rotting set of stained teeth, or what is left of them, with a
crimson, flesh-eating wound, relentlessly devouring the raw skin
surrounding it.50

46. Id. at 36,639.
47. Id. at 36,633.
48. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“FDA failed
to present any data—much less the substantial evidence required under the APA—showing that
enacting their proposed graphic warnings will accomplish the agency’s stated objective of
reducing smoking rates.”).
49. Compare Jeremy Kees et al., Understanding How Graphic Pictorial Warnings Work on
Cigarette Packaging, 29 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 265, 270 (2010) (citing U.S. studies showing
favorable effects), with Matthew C. Farrelly et al., Youth Tobacco Prevention Mass Media
Campaigns: Past, Present, and Future Directions, 12 TOBACCO CONTROL i35, i40 (2003)
(demonstrating mixed effectiveness of state and national campaigns, and noting the difficulty of
separating out the impact of marketing campaigns from other anti-smoking measures).
50. Danielle Weatherby & Terri R. Day, The Butt Stops Here: The Tobacco Control Act’s
Anti-Smoking Regulations Run Afoul of the First Amendment, 76 ALB. L. REV. 121, 121–22
(2012); see also Stephanie J. Bennett, Paternalistic Manipulation Through Pictorial Warnings:
The First Amendment, Commercial Speech, and the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco
Control Act, 81 MISS. L.J. 1909, 1910 (2012) (“Imagine visiting your neighborhood grocery store
to buy snacks and beer for a special occasion. On the snack aisle, you select a box of Oreos from
the middle shelf. On the cookie package, you see an image of a pallid male cadaver, his autopsy
incision bound together by thick staples and black thread.”).
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Scholars are not the only ones struck by the emotional impact of the
FDA’s graphic warning labels; countless media articles refer to the images
selected by the FDA as “disgusting,”51 “gross,”52 and “shocking.”53
Representatives of the tobacco industry have similarly called them
“ghoulish,” “grisly,” and “ghastly.”54 A recent qualitative study of public
reactions to the FDA images reported one participant’s response to the
image of a man smoking through a tracheotomy hole: “Oh my God! . . . I
can’t even look at that again.”55
Unsurprisingly, the new labeling requirements faced substantial legal
challenges before their effective date—numerous tobacco manufacturers
and marketers raised First Amendment claims, arguing that the mandatory
inclusion of graphic warnings on cigarette packaging constitutes
unconstitutional compelled commercial speech. The two federal appeals
courts that analyzed the FDA labeling requirements, however, reached
opposing conclusions. In March 2012, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
Western District of Kentucky’s decision to uphold the graphic warning
requirements.56 Just one month later, however, the D.C. Circuit affirmed
the District of D.C.’s grant of summary judgment to R.J. Reynolds.57
On October 26, 2012, a group of tobacco companies petitioned the
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to resolve the circuit conflict;58 the
petition for certiorari was denied on April 22, 2013.59 The Department of
Justice announced in March 2013 that it would not seek Supreme Court
51. Casey Chan, Judge Says Putting Disgusting Warning Pictures on Cigarette Boxes Is a
Violation
of
Free
Speech,
GIZMODO
(Nov.
8,
2011,
1:20
PM),
http://gizmodo.com/5857530/judge-says-putting-disgusting-warning-pictures-on-cigarette-boxesis-a-violation-of-free-speech; Laura Stampler, Here Are the Disgusting Images a Court Just
Mandated for All Cigarette Packs, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 20, 2012, 1:43 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/here-are-the-disgusting-images-a-court-just-mandated-for-allcigarette-packs-2012-3?op=1#ixzz29TkkTu6W.
52. Thomas J. Glynn, Ewwww, That’s Gross! A New Era in U.S. Cigarette Labeling,
AMERICAN
CANCER
SOCIETY
(June
22,
2011),
http://www.cancer.org/cancer/news/expertvoices/post/2011/06/22/ewwww-thats-gross!-a-newera-in-us-cigarette-labeling.aspx.
53. Paul Waldman, The Ick Factor, AMERICAN PROSPECT (June 23, 2011),
http://prospect.org/article/ick-factor.
54. See Glynn, supra note 52.
55. Paul L. Reiter et al., Appalachian Residents’ Perspectives on New U.S. Cigarette
Warning Labels, 37 J. CMTY. HEALTH 1269, 1274 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
56. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 518, 568–69 (6th Cir.
2012).
57. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
58. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012),
petition for cert. filed, 81 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 26, 2012) (No. 12-521).
59. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012), cert.
denied sub nom. Am. Snuff Co. v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1996 (2013).
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review of the First Amendment challenges.60 Moreover, the Attorney
General of the United States noted that the FDA “remains free to conduct
new rulemaking proceedings under the Act, and [the FDA] can address
issues identified by the court of appeals.”61 He further stated that the
Department of Health and Human Services plans to “undertake research to
support a new rulemaking consistent with the Tobacco Control Act.”62
B. Ultrasound Display Prior to Abortion
The pro-life movement63 has long relied on the use of graphic imagery
to advocate against abortion. From the influential 1984 documentary The
Silent Scream to images of aborted fetuses displayed by protesters outside
Planned Parenthood, many abortion opponents use images meant to invoke
fear and shame in order to persuade women to “choose life.”64 In recent
years, however, the anti-abortion movement moved away from such
negative appeals.65 Rather than seeking to shame or horrify women into
continuing their pregnancies, pro-life advocates and their legislative
supporters recognized and harnessed the power of positive emotions that
fetal imagery can trigger.66
Piggybacking on this shifting trend, some states require that, as part of
the informed consent process, women seeking abortions review an

60. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., supra note 16.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. There is a vigorous debate within the reproductive rights community with respect to
terminology: whether to use “pro-life” (the term most commonly used by opponents of the
women’s right to choose abortion) or “anti-choice” (the preference of many supporters of
women’s reproductive choice). I use the term “pro-life” throughout this Article, not as an
endorsement of any political position, but merely because this term has a longer history and tends
to be more widely recognized among commentators on issues relating to reproductive rights.
64. See Drew Halfmann & Michael P. Young, War Pictures: The Grotesque as a Mobilizing
Tactic, 15 MOBILIZATION: AN INT’L QUARTERLY 1, 13–19 (2010) (noting that “‘photographic
evidence . . . transcends language and logic’” to “unveil the violence of abortion”); Hopkins et al.,
supra note 20, at 396 (“A key feature of contemporary anti-abortion campaigns is their use of fetal
imagery . . . .”); Keighley, supra note 11, at 2396–97 (explaining that, using ultrasound
technology, The Silent Scream depicts what appears to be a real abortion of a twelve-week old
fetus, thus presenting both graphic and unsettling propaganda against abortion).
65. This move may also be driven by popular opposition to public images of disgust. See
PUBLIC HEALTH CAMPAIGNS, supra note 39, at iv, 1 (noting that negative moralizing messages
have gradually evolved toward more positive methods, including humor); Hopkins et al., supra
note 20, at 396 (describing the rejection of a U.K. television ad featuring aborted fetuses on the
grounds that it “offend[ed] standards of taste and decency”).
66. Paul Lauritzen, Visual Bioethics, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 50, 51 (2008) (“Rather than seeking
to induce guilt and fear by showing pregnant women grisly images of aborted fetuses, many
‘pregnancy crisis centers’ strive to foster hope and a sense of caring by displaying images or
models of intact fetuses.”).
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informational pamphlet provided by the state;67 the pamphlet typically
includes color images of fetuses at various stages of development.68 In
recent years, a more controversial requirement adopted by state legislators
requires that a physician performing an abortion first either perform an
ultrasound, or offer the woman the opportunity to have an ultrasound.69
Louisiana, Oklahoma, North Carolina, Texas, and Wisconsin, however,
have gone even further—these states require that the medical provider
conduct an ultrasound display and describe the image to the patient, even if
the patient wishes not to see the image or hear the description.70 The
medical provider may also be required to make the fetal heartbeat audible to

67. See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(2)(D) (West 2010)
(requiring a physician to provide a pregnant woman seeking an abortion with printed materials
provided by the Texas Department of Health).
68. See generally A WOMAN’S RIGHT TO KNOW (Tex. Dep’t of Health ed., 2003), available
at http://www.dshs.state.tx.us/wrtk/pdf/booklet.pdf (describing the information to be included in
the pamphlet that Texas physicians are required by law to make available to women seeking
abortions); see also Nadia N. Sawicki, The Abortion Informed Consent Debate: More Light, Less
Heat, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 23 (2011) (discussing the Texas Department of Health
brochure and noting its apparent partiality to the state’s preferences).
69. See State Policies in Brief: Requirements for Ultrasound, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE
(Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RFU.pdf.
Five states
(Louisiana, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Texas, and Wisconsin) require an abortion provider to
perform an ultrasound, and to show and describe the image to the woman seeking an abortion,
prior to the procedure. Id. In North Carolina and Oklahoma, however, these controversial
ultrasound requirements have been held unenforceable and enjoined, respectively, per court
decision. Id. Seven states (Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Mississippi, and
Virginia) require the doctor to perform an ultrasound, but only offer the woman seeking an
abortion the opportunity to view the image. Id.
70. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.2(D)(2)(c) (2008) (amended 2012) (requiring that
the physician “display the screen which depicts the active ultrasound images so that the pregnant
woman may view them” and “provide a simultaneous and objectively accurate oral explanation of
what the ultrasound is depicting”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85(a) (2011) (amended 2013)
(requiring that the physician “perform an obstetric real-time view of the unborn child on the
pregnant woman,” “provide a simultaneous explanation of what the display is depicting,” and
“display the images so that the pregnant woman may view them”), preliminary injunction granted
by Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424 (M.D.N.C. 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738.3d(B)
(West 2004) (requiring that the physician “perform an obstetric ultrasound on the pregnant
woman,” “provide a simultaneous explanation of what the ultrasound is depicting,” and “display
the ultrasound images so that the pregnant woman may view them”), overruled by Nova Health
Sys. v. Pruitt, 292 P.3d 28 (2012); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(4) (West
2011) (requiring that the physician “displays the sonogram images in a quality consistent with
current medical practice in a manner that the pregnant woman may view them,” and “provides, in
a manner understandable to a layperson, a verbal explanation of the results of the sonogram
images”), upheld by Tex. Med. Providers v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 253.10 (West 2013) (requiring that the physician “provide [an] . . . oral explanation to the
pregnant woman during the ultrasound of what the ultrasound is depicting,” and “display the
ultrasound images so that the pregnant woman may view them”).
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the patient.71 In the case of a patient unwilling to view the mandated
images or listen to the mandated disclosure, the statutes explicitly permit
the patient to avert her eyes or avoid listening without being subjected to (or
subjecting the physician to) any penalty.72 The statutes do not detail how,
precisely, a patient would be able to avoid listening to the physician’s
description of the fetal characteristics other than by shutting her eyes and
closing off her ears.
Laws requiring women seeking abortions to view fetal imagery are
heralded by pro-life advocates as a valuable supplement to the traditional
informed consent process,73 which typically requires that physicians
disclose the risks, benefits, and alternatives to any medical procedure a
patient is about to undergo.74 Many proponents, however, are more explicit
about the fact that the true purpose of these laws is to dissuade women from
choosing abortion.75 Texas Governor Rick Perry, for example, described
Texas’s abortion ultrasound law as a “critical step in our efforts to protect
life.”76 Focus on the Family, a Christian ministry dedicated to promoting
traditional family values, contends that “‘when a woman considering
abortion can see her baby and hear the tiny heartbeat, she’s much more
likely to choose life.’”77 Even some supporters of abortion rights, including
Dr. Philip Stubblefield, former Board President of the National Abortion
Federation, concede that a “‘small percentage’” of women seeking
abortions might choose not to abort after viewing a consent form
“‘describing the embryo in terms of size and mass at certain times, and
71. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.2(D) (2008) (amended 2012) (mandatory);
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(4)(D) (West 2011) (mandatory); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 188.027.1(4) (2011) (optional); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85(a)(2) (2011) (amended
2013) (optional).
72. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.2(D)(3)(b) (2008) (amended 2013) (“A pregnant
woman may choose not to view the ultrasound images required to be provided to and reviewed
with the pregnant woman as provided for under this Section.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85(b)
(2011) (amended 2013) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent a pregnant woman
from averting her eyes from the displayed images or from refusing to hear the simultaneous
explanation and medical description.”).
73. Critics of these laws, however, question proponents’ arguments that the laws are merely
an extension of traditional informed consent doctrine. See Sawicki, supra note 68, at 10–18
(describing informed consent-based objections to abortion disclosure laws).
74. Sawicki, supra note 68, at 6–10.
75. See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion: Implications of Social
Science Research on Emotion for Reading Casey, 83 WASH. L. REV. 1, 22 (2008) (“There is little
question that the goal of many of these informed consent laws is dissuading women from pursuing
abortions, and they are likely somewhat successful.”); Keighley, supra note 11, at 2392–95
(discussing statutory language and legislative history supporting this point).
76. Keighley, supra note 11, at 2393–94.
77. Id. at 2400 (quoting Option Ultrasound: Revealing Life to Save Life, FOCUS ON THE
FAMILY (May 31, 2012), http://www.heartlink.org/pdf/DonorOUPUpdate.pdf).
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relating times at which heartbeat, movement and full development is
reached.’”78
Pro-life advocates support these claims by arguing that viewing a
representation of a fetus will trigger maternal instincts and mother-child
bonding, thereby reducing the likelihood that a woman will ultimately
choose abortion.79 This hypothesis was first proposed in a 1983
commentary in the New England Journal of Medicine.80 While there is
some evidence to support the theory of early initiation of fetal bonding in
the context of planned pregnancies,81 there is no scientific support for this
proposition in the context of unplanned pregnancies. The only study
directly targeting this question found that of the women who viewed
ultrasounds in anticipation of abortion, none changed their minds and many
viewed the ultrasound as a generally positive experience.82 Another study
78. Daniel Avila, The Right to Choose, Neutrality, and Abortion Consent in Massachusetts,
38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 511, 513–14 (2005) (quoting Planned Parenthood League of Mass. v.
Bellotti, 499 F. Supp. 215, 218–19 (D. Mass. 1980), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 641 F.2d
1006 (1st Cir. 1981)).
79. For further detail on the argument that fetal images are aimed at fostering maternal
emotions, see JANELLE S. TAYLOR, THE PUBLIC LIFE OF THE FETAL SONOGRAM: TECHNOLOGY,
CONSUMPTION, AND THE POLITICS OF REPRODUCTION 80 (2008) (noting that “[c]laims regarding
ultrasound’s capacity to promote maternal bonding . . . make regular public appearances in the
arguments put forth by people working to try to shape the ways ultrasound is used,” and that
“[s]ome of these people also seek to enlist ultrasound in their struggles to end abortion”); Carol
Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a Protected Choice, 56
UCLA L. REV. 351, 396–97 (2008) (arguing that ultrasound laws are grounded in the idea that
“the fetal image will overwhelm the decision to abort by triggering something like a primitive
maternal instinct”); Lauritzen, supra note 66, at 54 (describing The Silent Scream as “facilitating
an emotional identification between the viewer and the fetus”); Mills, Images and Emotion, supra
note 20, at 62 (“[T]here is thought to be something in the process or act of seeing the fetus that
impacts on a woman’s response to an emotional and ethical relationship with the fetus.”).
80. John C. Fletcher & Mark I. Evans, Maternal Bonding in Early Fetal Ultrasound
Examinations, 308 NEW ENG. J. MED. 392, 392 (1983) (theorizing that viewing the fetus “may
also influence the resolution of any ambivalence toward the pregnancy itself” and “may thus result
in fewer abortions”).
81. Researchers have concluded that having an ultrasound is generally a positive experience
for women with planned pregnancies. See id. at 392 (offering anecdotal evidence that the
ultrasound experience is “likely to increase the value of the early fetus” in a planned pregnancy);
M. A. Rustico et al., Two-Dimensional vs. Two-Plus Four-Dimensional Ultrasound in Pregnancy
and the Effect on Maternal Emotional Status: A Randomized Study, 25 ULTRASOUND IN
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 468, 470 (2005) (“The physical and kinesthetic awareness of the
fetus gives rise to an experience that in nature has been referred to as maternal–fetal attachment.”).
Indeed, a whole industry has arisen around 3D and 4D ultrasound technology to create keepsake
photos, further supporting the theory that the ultrasound experience is a positive one for women
with planned pregnancies. Keighley, supra note 11, at 2401–02.
82. Ellen R. Wiebe & Lisa Adams, Women’s Perceptions About Seeing the Ultrasound
Picture Before an Abortion, 14 EUR. J. CONTRACEPTION AND REPROD. HEALTH CARE 97, 99–101
(2009); see also A.A. Bamigboye et al., Should Women View the Ultrasound Image Before FirstTrimester Termination of Pregnancy?, 92 S. AFR. MED. J. 430, 431–32 (2002) (noting that in a
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found that, of the eighty-seven percent of women seeking abortions who did
not have ultrasounds (or had an ultrasound but chose not to view it), some
believed that viewing the fetal image might have caused them to feel guilty
and change their minds about having an abortion.83
Regardless of whether abortion opponents’ optimism about ultrasound
laws is warranted, the argument that mandatory ultrasounds will reduce
abortion rates is a compelling tool in the pro-life arsenal.84 The
development of prenatal ultrasound technology stands as a remarkable
example of the cultural impact of medical discovery. The prenatal
ultrasound, which allows a viewer to observe a living fetus in the womb,
has without a doubt facilitated public conversations about fetal personhood
and thereby affected the debate about abortion as public policy.85 Richard
Posner notes that before prenatal ultrasounds became available, pro-choice
advocates “could tell vivid stories and . . . show photographs of women
killed by botched illegal abortions, whereas the abortion ‘victim,’ the fetus,
was hidden from view.”86 When the fetal image became visible through
ultrasound technology, however, “the rhetorical advantage that proponents
of abortion rights had enjoyed by virtue of the heuristic” disappeared.87 The
now clearly visible fetus—complete with heartbeat, fingers, toes, and facial
expressions—made pro-life advocates’ arguments about fetal personhood
more concrete and more tactile.88
controlled trial where ultrasound screens for the control group faced the patient, and ultrasound
screens for the experimental group were turned away from the patient, there was no difference in
how many women ultimately chose to undergo pregnancy termination). The Bamigboye study
also found that, when asked after the fact, sixty-four percent of women planning to terminate their
pregnancies said they would prefer to see the ultrasound image. Id. at 431.
83. O. Graham et al., Viewing Ultrasound Scan Images Prior to Termination of Pregnancy:
Choice for Women or Conflict for Ultrasonographers?, 30 J. OBSTETRICS & GYNAECOLOGY 484,
486 (2010); see also Bamigboye et al., supra note 82, at 432 (reporting commentary from women
who preferred not to view the ultrasounds as “ha[ving] to do with guilt and avoidance”).
84. See TAYLOR, supra note 79, at 23 (“[C]onsidered as science, the theory of ultrasound
bonding is highly dubious, but considered as a social and cultural phenomenon it is very real
indeed.”).
85. See, e.g., Mills, Images and Emotion, supra note 20, at 61–62 (discussing views linking
fetal images and abortion debates); Petchesky, supra note 20, at 263–64 (explaining how fetal
images are used by antichoice proponents to project fetal personhood and influence reproductive
rights policy); Sanger, supra note 79, at 356–57 (discussing how fetal imagery “has been
incorporated into the regulation of abortion in the United States”).
86. Richard A. Posner, Emotion Versus Emotionalism in Law, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 309,
323 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999).
87. Id.
88. See Rita Beck Black, Seeing the Baby: The Impact of Ultrasound Technology, 1 J.
GENETIC COUNSELING 45, 46 (1992) (“Seeing the baby move seems to further confirm its life and
identity . . . .”); Joanne Boucher, The Politics of Abortion and the Commodification of the Fetus,
73 STUD. IN POL. ECON. 69, 76 (2004) (“[T]he public fetal image visually summarizes in an
appealing way the argument that ‘life begins at conception.’”); Mills, Images and Emotion, supra
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It is this reified, culturally laden, and emotional visualization of the
fetal body to which critics of the abortion ultrasound laws object most
strenuously. Numerous scholars of law, medical humanities, and feminist
theory have challenged the state’s use of ultrasound imagery in this context
on these grounds.89 The ultrasound image, according to many, represents a
single vantage point from which to understand the relationship between
mother and fetus,90 and improperly instructs women as to how they should
make the abortion decision,91 “including to what extent they should include
emotion in their deliberations.”92
As might be expected, the new state laws regarding abortion
ultrasounds have faced legal challenges.93 Lawsuits have met with mixed
success. The Fifth Circuit recently vacated a preliminary injunction against
such a law, noting that the display of ultrasound images did not violate the
First Amendment rights of physicians or the Fourteenth Amendment rights
of patients because it satisfied Casey’s requirement that information
note 20, at 62 (describing the impact of ultrasound technology on fetal embodiment); Rustico et
al., supra note 81, at 472 (commenting on “the growing importance of the power of the visual in
Western culture” and noting that “the visual technology of ultrasound enables the fetus to be seen
as a person”); Sanger, supra note 79, at 378 (arguing that ultrasound statutes are “meant to
transform the embryo or fetus from an abstraction to a baby in the eyes of the potentially aborting
mother”).
89. See LISA M. MITCHELL, BABY’S FIRST PICTURE: ULTRASOUND AND THE POLITICS OF
FETAL SUBJECTS 3–5 (2001) (critically discussing the normalization of ultrasound in various
countries); Caitlin E. Borgmann, Abortion, the Undue Burden Standard, and the Evisceration of
Women’s Privacy, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 291, 320 (2010) (criticizing ultrasound
requirements for their reliance on the impact fetal images will have on women’s decisions to
abort); James Rocha, Autonomous Abortions: The Inhibiting of Women’s Autonomy Through
Legal Ultrasound Requirements, 22 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 35, 38 (2012) (objecting to
mandatory ultrasound laws on the basis that they hinder the autonomous, individualized choices of
women).
90. See REBECCA KUKLA, MASS HYSTERIA: MEDICINE, CULTURE, AND MOTHERS’ BODIES
113–14 (2005) (describing the ultrasound image as socially constructed to represent a particular
perspective of maternal-fetal bonding); Petchesky, supra note 20, at 270 (concluding that “[t]he
fetus as we know it is a fetish”); Sanger, supra note 79, at 383 (describing that mandatory
ultrasound laws intended “to solidify the idea of a child so that the norms of maternal solicitude
and protection begin to take hold”).
91. See Rebecca Dresser, From Double Standard to Double Bind: Informed Choice in
Abortion Law, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1599, 1611 (2008) (describing ultrasound requirements as
state responses to Casey’s observation that most women considering abortion would consider its
impact on the fetus relevant to their decision).
92. Rocha, supra note 89, at 38.
93. In addition to the two cases discussed in this Article, an early lawsuit challenging a nowdefunct Louisiana abortion ultrasound law found the law unconstitutional on the grounds that the
ultrasound procedure impedes women’s access to abortions by increasing costs and lessening the
availability of abortion. Margaret S. v. Treen, 597 F. Supp. 636, 660 (E.D. La. 1984). A more
recent decision by the Oklahoma Supreme Court likewise found a pre-abortion ultrasound law
unconstitutional under Casey, but did not provide a substantive discussion of its decision. Nova
Health Sys. v. Pruitt, 292 P.3d 28 (Okla. 2012).
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provided as part of the abortion informed consent process be truthful and
not misleading.94 The Middle District of North Carolina in Stuart, in
contrast, applied strict scrutiny to the First Amendment claim and granted a
preliminary injunction against enforcement of an ultrasound law; it
concluded that the state’s interests in protecting women from emotional
distress, preventing coercion, and promoting life were not compelling
enough to justify requiring physicians to communicate messages with
which they disagree.95
III. OBJECTIONS TO EMOTIONAL PERSUASION
The bulk of the constitutional arguments against the health campaigns
described above focus on the wrongs suffered by speakers who are
compelled to communicate messages with which they disagree. The
primary objections, however, voiced by the general public, by media, and
by scholars of law and ethics rarely track the First Amendment arguments
against compelled speech. Rather, as highlighted in Part II, the core of the
public opposition to tobacco labeling and abortion ultrasound laws focuses
on the impropriety of the state’s use of emotional imagery for persuasive
purposes—that is, the format of the government’s message and the
emotions evoked in its audience, rather than its compulsion of third parties
to convey its message. This Part more fully describes the argument against
emotional persuasion, and highlights its roots in economic theory, social
psychology, political philosophy, applied ethics, and even some areas of
law.
Critics of the tobacco labeling and abortion ultrasound campaigns
recognize that the government must communicate with citizens in order to
achieve its policy goals. They believe, however, that while the government
has a right to express its perspective in public debate, it ought not
communicate this perspective in a manner that calls more upon citizens’
emotional instincts than their analytical skills. One legal scholar has
referred to “forcing unwanted imagery” on citizens as “a kind of violence

94. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Svcs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 580–84 (5th Cir.
2012) (holding that a mandatory ultrasound law’s provisions were “within the State’s power to
regulate” and that “[n]o extreme burden is placed on the physician, nor is the woman harmed if
she receives the printed matter”).
95. Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 432 (M.D.N.C. 2011) (holding that the mandatory
ultrasound law’s provisions were “likely to harm the psychological health of the very group the
state purports to protect”; that defendants failed to articulate how the provisions would reduce the
likelihood of coerced abortions; and that precedent has not suggested that the state interest in
potential life is “compelling” during the entire term of a woman’s pregnancy), aff’d, 706 F. 3d 345
(4th Cir. 2013).
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[that results in] emotional trauma.”96 Others have compared abortion
ultrasound laws to requiring that parties to a divorce first “participate in
individualized sessions where their own children could express face to face
how much they want Mommy and Daddy to stay married”;97 or asking
potential organ donors “to look at photographs of the next three people on
the donor list.”98
While the man on the street may articulate his opinion99 about graphic
tobacco and ultrasound images in terms as simple as “intrusive . . . and . . .
cruel,”100 “disgusting,”101 “gross,”102 and “shocking,”103 the ethical
argument against the state’s use of emotional persuasion has deep roots in a
variety of disciplines.
The fundamental principle grounding the objection to emotional
persuasion is the belief that persuasion is and ought to be a rational
process.104 The goal of persuasion is not simply to change a listener’s
opinion, but rather to change the listener’s opinion by appealing to analytic
skills, with the recognition that the listener may not ultimately choose to
adopt the persuader’s stance. Some scholars have described this distinction
as one between manipulation and persuasion.105 Others categorize these
96. Sherry F. Colb, Some Reflections on the Texas Pre-Abortion Ultrasound Law, a Year
After Its Passage, JUSTIA.COM (June 6, 2012), http://verdict.justia.com/2012/06/06/somereflections-on-the-texas-pre-abortion-ultrasound-law-a-year-after-its-passage-2.
97. Sanger, supra note 79, at 390.
98. Id. at 393; see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 937 n.7 (1992)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting that appendicitis patients are not required to look at their
appendix before consenting to its removal); Waldman, supra note 53 (“Imagine that you wanted to
lose weight, but you love ice cream. What if every time you reached for that carton of Ben &
Jerry’s, you had to look at a photo of a morbidly obese man dying from a heart attack? Would
that make you less likely to indulge?”).
99. Few people, scholars included, are able to clearly articulate their objections to emotional
persuasion. See Franklyn S. Haiman, Democratic Ethics and the Hidden Persuaders, 44 Q. J.
SPEECH 385, 386 (1958) (“The average American appears to feel considerable ambivalence in
regard to hidden persuasion. He vaguely senses there may be something wrong about it, but when
asked to say why, is usually unable to present cogent arguments.”); Rossi & Yudell, supra note
20, at 192 (noting that public health communications designed to influence have been viewed as
problematic, but “the reasons for this are often incompletely explained or explored”).
100. Kevin Sack, In Ultrasound, Abortion Fight Has New Front, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2010,
at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
101. Chan, supra note 51.
102. Glynn, supra note 52.
103. Waldman, supra note 53.
104. See Arthur N. Kruger, The Ethics of Persuasion: A Re-Examination, 16 THE SPEECH
TEACHER 295, 296 (1967) (arguing that the “emotional” mode of proof “belittles rational
processes [and] shows little faith in man’s ability to govern himself” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
105. See, e.g., BRYAN GARSTEN, SAVING PERSUASION: A DEFENSE OF RHETORIC AND
JUDGMENT 7 (2006) (distinguishing persuasion from manipulation, coercion, and brainwashing);
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two approaches as “strategic persuasion” and “deliberative persuasion.”106
For example, Nathaniel Klemp defines deliberative persuasion as the
sincere use of rhetoric and merit-based arguments “to induce agreement
with an orientation toward mutual understanding,” and strategic persuasion
as the inducement of agreement where the “intent to win trumps the intent
to achieve mutual understanding.”107 Whether described as manipulation or
persuasion, attempts to change a listener’s opinion by appealing to
something other than the listener’s capacity for reasoned analysis have long
been viewed as normatively inferior to rational persuasion.108
It should be emphasized that it is both impossible and undesirable to
categorize persuasive appeals as “strictly rational” or “strictly
emotional.”109 The exercise of reason falls on a spectrum.110 At one end of
the spectrum, an appeal can be made on primarily rational grounds—
presenting truthful facts on both sides of the argument, with no
inaccuracies, omissions, or biases. At the other end of the spectrum, we see
appeals that influence choices on grounds unrelated to reasoned argument,
such as those that aspire to change a listener’s emotional state and
decisions. Most persuasive appeals fall somewhere in between. That said,
the ethical arguments against arational or emotional persuasion do not
depend on there being a clear way to empirically assess whether any given
persuasive appeal is “more rational” or “more emotional.”111

Sarah Buss, Valuing Autonomy and Respecting Persons: Manipulation, Seduction, and the Basis
of Moral Constraints, 115 ETHICS 195, 210 (2005) (explaining the view that manipulation is
morally distinct from rational persuasion); Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Autonomy and Benevolent Lies, 18
J. VALUE INQUIRY 251, 258 (1984) (explaining how beliefs about autonomy compete with beliefs
about benevolent lies); Blumenthal-Barby & Burroughs, supra note 20, at 5 (asserting that
“[m]anipulation falls somewhere in between coercion . . . [and] rational persuasion”).
106. See Nathaniel Klemp, When Rhetoric Turns Manipulative: Disentangling Persuasion and
Manipulation, in MANIPULATING DEMOCRACY: DEMOCRATIC THEORY, POLITICAL
PSYCHOLOGY, AND MASS MEDIA 59, 70 (Wayne Le Cheminant & John M. Parrish, eds., 2011)
[hereinafter MANIPULATING DEMOCRACY] (providing contrasting definitions of strategic and
deliberative persuasion).
107. Id. at 70-71; see also James Fishkin, Manipulation and Democratic Theory, in
MANIPULATING DEMOCRACY, supra note 106, at 31, 34 (arguing that persuasion or deliberation,
unlike manipulation, contemplates “a dialogue or debate in which accurate information is
available and in which it is expected that the other side will have its say”).
108. See Buss, supra note 105, at 208–10 (describing views on the morally problematic nature
of manipulation).
109. See Klemp, supra note 106, at 67–68 (problematizing the “simple dichotomy between
emotion and reason”).
110. See Fishkin, supra note 107, at 34 (describing a continuum running from rational
deliberation to manipulation).
111. See Buss, supra note 105, at 208–10 (discussing arguments against emotional persuasion
that rest on ethical objections).
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Examples of the perceived primacy of rational over emotional
decisionmaking are abundant. Traditional economic theory, for example,
assumes rational behavior on the part of actors in the marketplace (though
economists’ definitions of rationality may differ from the layperson’s
definitions).112 This fundamental premise, however, has been widely
criticized in recent years, most notably by behavioral economists who offer
evidence that human decisionmaking rarely follows purely rational
pathways and that, as a result, we often make economically inefficient
choices.113 That said, the practical application of the insights gleaned from
behavioral economics seems to be aimed primarily at circumventing the
nonrational aspects of human decisionmaking, such as inherent biases, the
use of heuristics, and other psychological faults in an effort to optimize
behavior.114 Thus, even economic theories that recognize the failings of
human rationality strive to highlight these failings in an effort to encourage
decisionmakers to reach the outcomes that a rational actor, unhindered by
cognitive biases, would reach.115
The ideal of the rational actor as mediator of decisions is further
supported by empirical research in social psychology. Daniel Kahneman,
for example, describes human decisionmaking as a combination of two
systems.116 Our primary (or peripheral) system makes choices quickly and
easily, often relying on heuristics and past experience, to facilitate our day-

112. See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 153 (1976)
(defining rational behavior as “consistent maximization of a well-ordered function, such as a
utility or profit function”).
113. See, e.g., DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE
OUR DECISIONS 1– 21 (HarperCollins rev. ed. 2009) (explaining how ordinary decisions are more
relative than objectively rational); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE:
IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 17–39 (2009) (describing
common cognitive errors that lead to irrational choices).
114. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 113, at 74 (pointing to how information about
when we are least likely to make good decisions can be used to improve our decisionmaking
capacities).
115. Interestingly, however, advocates of the “nudge” model of behavioral economics
frequently rely on the very same heuristics and cognitive biases they criticize in order to change
peoples’ behavior. In the example introduced by Thaler and Sunstein in NUDGE, they consider a
cafeteria manager who, in an effort to encourage healthy eating, changes the design of the
cafeteria buffet to place healthier options at the head of the line (taking advantage of a common
cognitive bias). Id. at 1–2.
116. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 20–21 (2011) (“System 1 operates
automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and sense of voluntary control. . . . System 2
allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it, including complex
computations. The operations of System 2 are often associated with the subjective experience of
agency, choice, and concentration.”).
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to-day decisionmaking.117 Our secondary (or central) system, instead, relies
more on reasoned analysis and expends far greater energy and effort in
making choices.118 While some scholars in other disciplines have described
emotional or primary decisionmaking as “short-circuiting” reason and
leading to poor choices,119 Kahneman and his colleagues are explicit in
saying that neither process is privileged or better.120 Primary decisions, for
example, are an extremely efficient and highly accurate means of operating
in the day-to-day world—for example, we do not need to conduct a
secondary central analysis of which sock to put on first when we get
dressed in the morning. Even Kahneman, however, cautions that peripheral
reasoning may occasionally lead us astray, and that central reasoning should
be used as a check on peripheral reasoning if people want to make optimal
decisions.121
Concerns about the use of emotional persuasion are even stronger
beyond the realm of the empirical disciplines. In philosophy, rhetoric, and
political theory, many commentators advise caution in the use of emotion to
persuade, especially by government actors.
In philosophy, nonconsequentialist moral theories emphasize the
importance of autonomy in personal decisionmaking. Autonomy has been
defined by one author as “a capacity and disposition to make choices in a
rational manner,” that is, without being subject to obstacles that interfere
with rational choice.122 This conception of autonomy has its roots in

117. Psychology research about the impact of images on decisionmaking suggests that images
and emotional prompts trigger the primary system, bypassing the reasoned analysis of the
secondary system. See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of
Copyright, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683, 691–93 (2012) (noting that messages conveyed in visual
terms will trigger emotional responses more quickly than textual or verbal messages).
118. KAHNEMAN, supra note 116, at 21.
119. See Kruger, supra note 104, at 300 (“[W]hen man experiences strong feelings, he tends to
short-circuit his thinking process, to jump to conclusions, to act hastily, to yield to atavistic
impulses.”); Posner, supra note 86, at 310–11 (“[E]motion short-circuits reason conceived of as a
conscious, articulate process of deliberation, calculation, analysis, or reflection.”).
120. KAHNEMAN, supra note 116, at 408–18; see also Posner, supra note 86, at 310–11
(“Emotion is an efficient method of cognition in some cases but an inefficient one in others. . . .
[E]motion focuses attention, crystallizes evaluation, and prompts action in circumstances in which
reflection would be interminable, unfocused, and indecisive. But in situations in which making an
intelligent decision requires careful, sequential analysis or reflection, emotion may, by supplanting
that process, generate an inferior decision.”).
121. KAHNEMAN, supra note 116, at 408–18.
122. Hill, supra note 105, at 256; see also TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS,
PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 58–59 (6th ed. 2009) (defining autonomy as “at a minimum,
self-rule that is free from both controlling interference by others and from limitations such as an
inadequate understanding that prevents meaningful choice”).
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Immanuel Kant’s writings in The Metaphysics of Morals.123 Kant identifies
the principle of autonomy, or self-governance, as “the sole principle of
ethics.”124 According to Kant, only rational beings have autonomy of will,
and it is by virtue of our rationality and autonomy that we can access and
act upon moral truths.125 The exercise of what Kant calls practical reason
must be done without reference to externalities or “alien influences” that
cloud one’s judgment.126 Such alien influences, according to Kant, include
“incitements from desires and impulses (and therefore from the whole
sensible worlds of nature),”127 as well as influences from third parties.128 In
his writing, he refers to passion,129 envy,130 pain,131 and concerns about
reputation,132 among others, as influences that weaken autonomy and moral
resolve.133 Kant’s ideas are widely reflected in contemporary literature on
applied ethics134—particularly medical ethics135 and communication

123. See generally IMMANUEL KANT, THE MORAL LAW: KANT’S GROUNDWORK OF THE
METAPHYSIC OF MORALS (H.J. Paton trans., Hutchinson Univ. Library 1966) (1948) [hereinafter
KANT, MORAL LAW].
124. Id. at 102.
125. Id. at 101.
126. Id. at 109.
127. Id. at 118.
128. In his essay, What Is Enlightenment?, Kant described enlightenment as “the human
being’s emergence from his self-incurred minority” and called on his readers to have the courage
to use their own understanding “without direction from another.” See JOHN STUART MILL, ON
LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 40 (2010) (“A person whose desires and impulses are his own—are
the expression of his own nature, as it has been developed and modified by his own culture—is
said to have a character. One whose desires and impulses are not his own, has no character, no
more than a steam-engine has a character.”).
129. IMMANUEL KANT, 2 ESSAYS AND TREATISES ON MORAL, POLITICAL, AND VARIOUS
PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECTS 16 (Hoffman 1798) [hereinafter KANT, ESSAYS AND TREATISES].
130. IMMANUEL KANT, 2 THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, DIVIDED INTO METAPHYSICAL
ELEMENTS OF LAW AND OF ETHICS 47 (Hoffman 1799).
131. Id.
132. KANT, MORAL LAW, supra note 123, at 89.
133. KANT, ESSAYS AND TREATISES, supra note 129, at 124.
134. See, e.g., Eric M. Cave, What’s Wrong with Motive Manipulation?, 10 ETHICAL THEORY
& MORAL PRACTICE 129, 136 (2007) (“[Mo]tive manipulation might be wrong because it violates
the injunction to act autonomously. This injunction is associated most closely with Kant’s moral
philosophy. On Kant’s view, to act autonomously is to act rationally, to act from an awareness of
the requirements of reason alone.”).
135. See, e.g., BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 122, at 100 (focusing on the importance
of autonomy in the context of healthcare decisions); Blumenthal-Barby & Burroughs, supra note
20, at 4 (noting that “manipulation always involves some infringement on a person’s autonomy”);
Rossi & Yudell, supra note 20, at 193 (arguing that “persuasion infringes upon autonomy, [] it
leads to inadvertent harm, and [] it is objectionable on principle because persuasive messages are
rationally indefensible”).
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ethics.136 While it is clear that not all third-party appeals to emotion are
violations of autonomy, the line between autonomy-defeating emotional
appeals and permissible emotional appeals is, as many scholars recognize,
an extremely difficult one to draw.137
The discipline of rhetoric, or the art of effective communication,
likewise shares concerns about the use of emotion to persuade. Traditional
theories of rhetoric describe the concept as composed of three primary
elements: logos (logic, or the truth of the ideas presented), pathos (appeals
to emotion, passion, or prejudice), and ethos (the listeners’ impression of
the credibility or character of the advocate).138 Aristotle described the value
of pathos as follows: Persuasion is effected “through the medium of the
hearers, when they shall have been brought to a state of excitement under
the influence of the speech; for we do not, when influenced by pain or joy,
or partiality or dislike, award our decisions in the same way.”139 This
principle—that influencing a listener’s emotions is necessary to affect her
judgment—is still widely recognized today.140 Most rhetoricians view this
technique as a positive one,141 noting that emotional appeals are uniquely
136. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 334, 354 (1991) (“Violating the persuasion principle is wrong for some of the
reasons that lies [that are told for the purpose of influencing behavior] are wrong: both involve a
denial of autonomy in the sense that they interfere with a person’s control over her own reasoning
processes. This justification of the persuasion principle can be characterized as Kantian.”).
137. See, e.g., Rossi & Yudell, supra note 20, at 193 (noting that while “[a] number of ethical
critiques of health communication have asserted that attempts to influence message recipients by
definition infringe upon their autonomy[,] . . . these claims are often general, and when they are
evaluated in more detail against specific criteria for autonomous choice, doubt emerges that
persuasion intrinsically infringes upon autonomy”).
138. BRIAN VICKERS, IN DEFENCE OF RHETORIC 19–21 (1988) (describing “the three kinds or
modes of persuasion”).
139. ARISTOTLE, TREATISE ON RHETORIC 12 (Theodore Buckley trans., Prometheus 1995)
(1851).
140. See Hugh Blair, Lectures of Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, Lecture XXXII, in THE
RHETORICAL TRADITION: READINGS FROM CLASSICAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 824–25 (Patricia
Bizzell & Bruce Herzberg eds., 1990) (describing the persuasive power of pathos and ethos);
George Campbell, The Philosophy of Rhetoric, in THE RHETORICAL TRADITION: READINGS FROM
CLASSICAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 903–04 (Patricia Bizzell & Bruce Herzberg eds., 1990)
(“[T]he most complex of all, which is calculated to influence the will, and persuade to a certain
conduct, is in reality an artful mixture of that which proposes to convince the judgment, and that
which interests the passions, its distinguishing excellency results from these two, the
argumentative and the pathetic incorporated together.”); RICHARD WEAVER, THE ETHICS OF
RHETORIC 9 (1953) (“Rhetorical language on the other hand, for whatever purpose used, excites
interest and with it either pleasure or alarm.”).
141. See, e.g., EDWARD P.J. CORBETT, CLASSICAL RHETORIC FOR THE MODERN STUDENT 86
(3d ed. 1990) (“There is nothing necessarily reprehensible about being moved to action through
our emotions; in fact, it is perfectly normal . . . [because] many of our actions are prompted by the
stimulus of our emotions.”); MARCUS FABIUS QUINTILIANUS, Book XII, in 2 QUINTILIAN’S
INSTITUTES OF ELOQUENCE: OR, THE ART OF SPEAKING IN PUBLIC, IN EVERY CHARACTER AND
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capable of “excit[ing] public opinion” and drawing people into debate in
ways that neutral and factual appeals cannot.142 In particular, many
rhetoricians focus on the use of vivid images as emotionally triggering. 143
Even the most prominent supporters of the use of pathos, however, warn
that this technique can be problematic. As one scholar notes, Aristotle
emphasized the importance of nonrational methods of persuasion, but
cautioned that “perhaps the greatest and most dangerous disadvantage of
democracy is that such citizens are alternately agitated, pandered to,
flattered, and fooled by demagogues who play to their hopes, their
prejudices, and—most especially—their fears.”144 Many commentators
note that emotional appeals may be used in either appropriate or
inappropriate ways;145 however, the distinction between the two is often
unclear.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, political theory also raises
concerns about emotional persuasion by government agents. Even if
persuading people through emotionally laden imagery is permissible, as
some might argue, the use of such techniques by those in positions of power
raises independent ethical concerns. Theories of deliberative democracy in
political science literature, for example, reinforce the emphasis on reasoned
persuasion in the context of government communication. Jürgen Habermas,
for example, believes that law’s legitimacy depends on the quality of public
deliberation and argues that state manipulation violates the principles of

CAPACITY 440 (W. Guthrie ed., 1805) [hereinafter QUINTILIAN ] (“[A]s [the orator’s] profession
leads him to give delight and emotion, and to mould the mind of the hearer into various affections,
he is justified in taking advantage of those assistancies, which even nature bids him employ.”).
142. See Book III, in 1 QUINTILIAN, supra note 141, at 167–68 (to persuade the people, “it is
generally necessary to give a circumstantial detail of the affair, so as to move their passions,
which is the great point . . . In order to do this, we are frequently to rouse, and to calm, their
resentments; we are to work upon their fears, their wishes, their hatred, and to touch every spring
of their passions.”); see also WEAVER, supra note 140, at 9 (“People listen instinctively to the man
whose speech betrays inclination. It does not matter what the inclination is toward, but we may
say that the greater the degree of inclination, the greater the curiosity or response.”).
143. See JOHN H. MACKIN, CLASSICAL RHETORIC FOR MODERN DISCOURSE 195 (1969)
(citing “the use of living pictures of events” as a way to make emotional appeals more effective);
John Bender & David E. Wellbery, Rhetoricality: On the Modernist Return of Rhetoric, in THE
ENDS OF RHETORIC: HISTORY, THEORY, PRACTICE 3, 32 (John Bender & David E. Wellbery eds.,
1990) (noting that “[i]mages and slogans [have] replace[d] the ideas and expository discourse by
which exchange in the public sphere [is] defined”); VICKERS, supra note 138, at 79 (citing
Shakespeare to illustrate the impact of emotional appeal in speech).
144. Terence Ball, Manipulation: As Old as Democracy Itself (and Sometimes Dangerous), in
MANIPULATING DEMOCRACY, supra note 106, at 41, 54.
145. See, e.g., CORBETT, supra note 141, at 87 (noting that “some people play on other
people’s emotions for unscrupulous purposes,” and that this “may constitute a caution about the
use of emotional appeal”).
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democratic discourse.146 Likewise, Kant refers to such tactics as “erod[ing]
the democratic ideal of popular sovereignty.”147 Some contemporary
commentators have focused specifically on the violation of norms of public
discourse that occur when “grotesque imagery” is introduced into
deliberations.148
Much of the opposition to government emotional
persuasion arises from the idea that an actor in a position of power, when
using emotion to persuade, is engaging in unfair terms of social
exchange.149 There is, according to some, an important distinction
“between manipulative practices of persuasion, which we tolerate for
selling consumer products, and the sort of collective public will formation
that makes democracy meaningful.”150 Those in positions of power, it is
argued, ought not encourage arational decisionmaking.151
The arguments against emotional persuasion that arise from ethics,
rhetoric, and political philosophy are not, however, merely lip service to an
impractical ideal. Indeed, in at least one area of law, the argument against
the government’s use of emotional persuasion takes a very concrete form.
Prosecutors in criminal trials frequently introduce graphic and emotionally
stirring evidence to plead their case before a jury.152 Evidence law,
however, which prohibits the use of prejudicial evidence, poses limits on
146. Ball, supra note 144, at 41.
147. See Klemp, supra note 106, at 76–77 (noting that political manipulation “erodes the
epistemic quality of political debate” and “threatens the ideal of democracy as rule of the
people”).
148. Halfmann & Young, supra note 64.
149. See, e.g., Patricia Greenspan, The Problem with Manipulation, 40 AM. PHIL. Q. 155, 160
(2003) (“Manipulation is unfair to the extent that it involves taking more than one’s fair share of
power over the other party’s choice situation—whether by deception or some other means.”);
Klemp, supra note 106, at 81 (“As power relationships grow more asymmetrical, however, the
immorality of manipulation increases,” as in politics.).
150. Fishkin, supra note 107, at 39.
151. See Kruger, supra note 104, at 300 (“A truly ethical speaker respects the intelligence of
his listeners and tries to get them to think about what he is saying, however difficult thinking
might be for some. Only in this way does he show any respect for democratic values, which
presume that people can think for themselves and govern themselves intelligently.”). Critics may
caution that governments are not the only entities with sufficient power to make emotional
persuasion unethical. Some tobacco companies, for example, have a net worth in excess of that of
some countries, and thus can assert significant power over consumer preferences. If this is the
case, critics might argue, perhaps the argument from deliberative democracy ought to be extended
to protect against emotional persuasion by powerful non-governmental entities. I recognize this as
a possibility, and offer the argument from a deliberative democracy perspective merely in the
context of state speech, without comment as to other forms of speech. I take no stance on whether
and to what extent the ethics of public communications differ from the ethics of private
communications—indeed, this would require a much more thorough interrogation of the values
implicated in corporate communication.
152. See Susan A. Bandes, Introduction to THE PASSIONS OF LAW, supra note 86, AT 1, 1–2
(outlining ways emotion enters the courtroom).
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the use of emotionally gripping evidence such as gruesome photographs
and videos: Federal Rule of Evidence (“FRE”) 403 permits a court to
exclude even unquestionably relevant evidence where the danger of “unfair
prejudice” substantially outweighs the evidence’s probative value.153 The
Advisory Committee Notes to FRE 403 define unfair prejudice as “an
undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly,
though not necessarily, an emotional one.”154 Many commentators, rightly
or wrongly, equate FRE 403, which focuses on prejudice, with emotion.155
In short, the basis of this rule is the exact sort of argument highlighted in
the ethical discussion above—that it is wrong to take advantage of emotion
to persuade.156 In addition to these ethical concerns, pragmatic concerns
ground FRE 403—namely, the idea that “jurors might incorrectly decide a
case if they vote with their hearts rather than their heads.”157 Both
practicing attorneys and laypeople tend to think of jurors’ tendency toward
feelings such as compassion, mercy, anger, and vengeance as

153. FED. R. EVID. 403.
154. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s notes.
155. See Andrew K. Dolan, Rule 403: The Prejudice Rule in Evidence, 49 S. CAL. L. REV.
220, 238 (1976) (“To be prejudicial, evidence must appeal to irrationality or emotion.”); Victor J.
Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the Nature of Unfairly Prejudicial
Evidence, 58 WASH. L. REV. 497, 503 (1982) (“Current case law considers ‘emotion’ the hallmark
of unfair prejudice.”); Thomas F. Green, Jr., Relevancy and Its Limits, 1969 L. & SOC. ORD. 533,
543–44 (1969) (describing emotional arousal as the primary evil to be prevented by the prejudice
rule).
156. See Terry A. Maroney, Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field,
30 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 119, 120 (2006) (“A core presumption underlying modern legality is that
reason and emotion are different beasts entirely: they belong to separate spheres of human
existence; the sphere of law admits only of reason; and vigilant policing is required to keep
emotion from creeping in where it does not belong.”); Richard L. Wiener et al., Emotion and the
Law: A Framework for Inquiry, 30 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 231, 232 (2006) (“[M]ost studies of legal
decision making treat emotion (and motivation) as unwanted intruders in the objective world of
weighing inputs and throughputs to reach one of a very few permissible outputs.”); see also
Bandes, supra note 152, at 2 (“In the conventional story, emotion has a certain, narrowly defined
place in law. . . . [I]t is portrayed as crucially important to narrowly delineate [emotion’s] . . .
proper roles, so that emotion doesn’t encroach on the true preserve of law: which is reason.”); id.
at 7 (“[E]motion, by its very nature, threatens much of what law hopes to be. To the extent legal
systems thrive on categorical rules, emotion in all its messy individuality makes such categories
harder to maintain.”). But see Posner, supra note 86, at 310 (describing the “dichotomizing [of]
reason and emotion” as “misleading”).
157. J. Alexander Tanford, A Political-Choice Approach to Limiting Prejudicial Evidence, 64
IND. L.J. 831, 841 (1989); see also Bandes, supra note 152, at 7 (“[E]motions cause prejudice
because they mislead jurors into making hasty decisions based on passion instead of slowly
evaluating all the evidence.”).
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“illegitimate”158 or “untrustworth[y],”159 potentially leading to inferential
error,160 errors in logic,161 and inaccuracy.162
There are, of course, a number of powerful counterarguments to the
argument against emotional persuasion. First, the argument, most closely
associated with David Hume, that the preference for rational reasoning is
invalid because it does not accurately represent how people actually make
decisions—namely, that our decisions are ultimately driven by passion
rather than reason.163 Indeed, this argument echoes the findings of some
researchers in social psychology, like Kahneman.164
Second, utilitarians may argue that triggering arational instincts like
emotion is necessary to get people to engage in public debate. Some
scholars of political philosophy, for example, believe that the government
would be remiss if it did not rely on all the tools at its disposal, even
emotional cues, to persuade the public of the merits of greater policy
goals.165 Aristotle argued that, in order to succeed in politics, one must
“magnify or minimize the leading facts, excite the required state of emotion
in your hearers, and refresh their memories[;]”166 these principles are often
reflected in the theory of rhetoric.167 This utilitarian claim, however, while
compelling to a consequentialist, does not adequately address the
158. Bandes, supra note 152, at 2.
159. Tushnet, supra note 117, at 697.
160. See Victor J. Gold, Limiting Judicial Discretion to Exclude Prejudicial Evidence, 18 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 59, 72 (1984) (“[F]ew other rules [than Rule 403] are directly concerned with
evidence that, while accurately reflecting a fact or event, may still lead the jury away from the
truth because the evidence induces the jury to draw illogical or otherwise improper inferences
from that fact or event.”); see also Gold, supra note 155, at 498–99 (“[E]vidence may be
considered unfairly prejudicial when it has a tendency to cause the trier of fact to commit an
inferential error.”).
161. See Gold, supra note 160, at 76 (“Evidence presents a Rule 403 problem precisely
because of the danger the jury will not use the evidence in a perfectly logical way.”).
162. See id. at 65–66 (“Emotion is therefore dangerous since it may lead to inaccuracy.”).
163. See David Hume, Book II, Part III. Of the Will and Direct Passions, in 2 THE
PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS OF DAVID HUME 167 (1826) (“I shall endeavour to prove first, that
reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will; and secondly, that it can never
oppose passion in the direction of the will.”).
164. See supra text accompanying notes 116–121.
165. For an example of this type of reasoning, consider the FDA’s comment in R.J. Reynolds
that “their previous efforts to combat the tobacco companies’ advertising campaigns have been
like bringing a butter knife to a gun fight.” R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205,
1221 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
166. Klemp, supra note 106, at 59.
167. See generally Ball, supra note 144, at 43, 45, 50–52 (noting that “democracy and
manipulation have been bedfellows since the origin of democracy” and providing examples
thereof, such as Ancient Athenian theater, which incorporated criticisms of democracy, and
Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, which transposed values espoused in the Declaration of
Independence into the Constitution).
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deontologists’ concerns about arational persuasion detracting from
autonomous decisionmaking.
These objections are certainly worth exploring further. It would
indeed be naïve to think the government could succeed in achieving its
policy goals by relying on facts and figures alone, which are unlikely to
draw people into deliberative debate.168 For example, it may well be the
case that utilitarian arguments in favor of emotional persuasion are strong
enough to outweigh the ethical challenges, at least in some contexts (though
identifying those contexts may be challenging). Indeed, “[i]n practice,
states take into account a variety of consequentialist concerns when making
policy decisions, and often prioritize these concerns over considerations
raised by theorists of deontology and virtue ethics.”169
This Article does not propose that states abandon concerns about the
practical outcomes of their policy decisions—outcomes do matter,
especially on issues of national importance. Rather, it emphasizes, as I
argue in another article on this topic, that “when states rely on persuasive
messaging to achieve favorable policy goals without considering the
methods by which they seek to persuade, important ethical considerations
are lost.”170
Moreover, as a general matter, these legitimate consequentialist
defenses of emotional persuasion by the state do not detract from the fact
that objections to emotional persuasion have a long and storied history
within a wide variety of disparate disciplines, and therefore may reasonably
be presumed to have some legitimate grounding. The fact that these
objections are being raised still, even by members of the public with no
training in political philosophy or applied ethics, further supports the
importance of research into whether doctrines of American constitutional
law reflect any recognition of these concerns.
IV. EXISTING CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSES NEGLECT CONCERNS ABOUT
THE EMOTIONAL IMPACT OF IMAGERY
The constitutional challenges to the tobacco and ultrasound laws take a
variety of approaches. First Amendment challenges argue that the laws
compel speakers to communicate government messages with which they
168. See GARSTEN, supra note 105, at 36 (“Rhetorical appeals to people’s partial and
passionate points of view can often be a good means of drawing out their capacity for judgment
and so drawing them into deliberation”); Haiman, supra note 99, at 388 (noting that emotional
persuasion may “stimulate [a person’s] thinking by bringing him into vivid contact with a problem
he has not thought about before”).
169. Sawicki, supra note 18, at 47.
170. Id.
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may not agree; tobacco manufacturers rely on the doctrine of compelled
commercial speech to make this claim. Medical providers, moreover, have
raised additional arguments about the rights of professionals to be free from
state intrusion into professional speech, a category of speech that the
Supreme Court has not yet addressed with any clarity. Additional
arguments include tobacco manufacturers’ claims under the Fifth
Amendment that the mandated tobacco warnings constitute an unlawful
taking;171 and arguments that pre-abortion ultrasounds violate women’s
Fourteenth Amendment rights to reproductive privacy.
While these constitutional arguments reflect a variety of ethical
principles—including the freedom to speak one’s own mind freely; the
freedom to remain silent when asked to communicate state-sponsored
messages; the autonomy of medical providers to define their scope of
practice and make patient-specific determinations about medical care;
professionals’ fiduciary obligations toward their patients; and the ethical
principles of informed consent—one is conspicuously absent. The
constitutional doctrines available to challengers of the tobacco and
ultrasound laws, at least as they have been interpreted to date, do not
obviously reflect the concerns described in Part III about the means by
which the government communicates its policy messages.
This Part focuses on the First and Fourteenth Amendment challenges
that form the core of the pending lawsuits. It explains how the few federal
courts that have reached substantive decisions on the tobacco and
ultrasound challenges have analyzed the issues, including the extent to
which they have considered litigants’ arguments about emotional
persuasion. Only one precedential decision has explicitly recognized
concerns about the emotional impact of the state-mandated imagery, though
the issue has been highlighted by two dissenting judges. The remaining
courts that have resolved the tobacco and ultrasound challenges have either
dismissed or failed to address litigants’ arguments about emotional
persuasion. Thus, existing precedent in these contexts provides limited
171. See, e.g., Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 540 (W.D.
Ky. 2010) (finding lack of jurisdiction on the takings claim), aff’d in part, rev’d in part by Disc.
Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F. 3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012). Takings arguments
have also been particularly prominent in international litigation relating to tobacco labeling laws,
in part because other nations do not offer speech protections as strong as those in the United
States. See, e.g., JT Int’l SA v Commonwealth (2012) 291 ALR 669, 673 (Austl.) (addressing
plaintiffs’ arguments that tobacco labeling laws constitute unlawful acquisition of property within
the meaning of the Australian Constitution); Abal Hermanos, S.A. v. Uruguay, (2010) Sentencia
No. 1713 (Suprema Corte de Justicia) [Supreme Court of Uruguay], available at
http://www.tobaccocontrollaws.org/litigation/decisions/uy-20101117-abal-hermanos,-s.a.-v.uruguay (addressing plaintiffs’ arguments that tobacco labeling laws interfered with property
rights by expropriating use of trademarks without fair compensation).
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support for the argument, which this Article defends in Part V, that the
emotional impact of persuasive compelled imagery is relevant to the
constitutional analysis.
A. First Amendment Challenges
The primary constitutional challenge raised against the tobacco and
ultrasound laws is a First Amendment compelled speech challenge.
Petitioners in these cases argue that the government’s mandate that tobacco
manufacturers and physicians communicate messages with which they
disagree violates the First Amendment’s prohibition on compelled speech.
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits laws
abridging the freedom of speech.172 First Amendment doctrine, which is
aimed at government interference with private speech, does not, however,
impose direct restrictions on the government as a speaker.173 Therefore,
from a constitutional perspective, the government generally has wide
latitude to disseminate information that it deems to be of public benefit.174
One limitation on government communication—highlighted in the
tobacco and ultrasound lawsuits—is that the government faces significant
restrictions when it seeks to compel a third party to communicate a message
on its behalf.175 Typically in such cases, strict scrutiny applies: in order for
an intervention to satisfy constitutional muster, the government must
demonstrate that its speech mandate is narrowly tailored to meet a
compelling state interest.176 The compelling state interest test, as one might
imagine, cannot be satisfied where the mandated speech is ideological in

172. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
173. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 562, 566–67 (2005) (concluding
that the Free Speech Clause does not regulate government speech); Blocher, supra note 1, at 706–
08 (noting that “government speech” is a defense to First Amendment claims by individuals).
Indirect restrictions on government speech are typically derived from citizens’ First Amendment
rights, and include the Establishment Clause, the opening of public forums, and the captive
audience doctrine; see also Pleasant Grove v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467–70 (2009) (concluding
that the Free Speech Clause does not regulate government speech, but noting that restrictions on
government speech include the Establishment Clause, and electoral and political processes);
YUDOF, supra note 1, at 214 (describing the Establishment Clause as “special: that clause is the
only substantive constitutional restraint on what governments may say”).
174. See Blocher, supra note 1, at 726 (referring to government speech as a “‘glaring
exception to the First Amendment norm that the government must be viewpoint neutral’” (citing
The Supreme Court—Leading Cases—G. Freedom of Speech and Expression, 119 HARV. L. REV.
277, 283 (2005))).
175. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943) (finding that the
Framers of the Bill of Rights objected to coerced forms of communication, including forcing
children to salute the flag in school).
176. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977).
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nature. As the Supreme Court noted in Wooley v. Maynard,177 “where the
State’s interest is to disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to
some, such interest cannot outweigh an individual’s First Amendment right
to avoid becoming the courier for such message.”178
Where petitioners are engaged in commercial speech, the
government’s burden is lowered. The Supreme Court defines commercial
speech as “expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker
and its audience.”179 The line between commercial and non-commercial
speech, however, is by no means easy to draw.180 Where commercial and
non-commercial speech are inextricably intertwined, courts typically regard
the speech as non-commercial in nature, and therefore hold that regulations
on the speech are subject to strict scrutiny.181
There appears to be some confusion among the lower courts as to how
these standards should be applied in the compelled speech context. In Riley
v. National Federation of the Blind,182 the Supreme Court stated, “Our
lodestars in deciding what level of scrutiny to apply to a compelled
statement must be the nature of the speech taken as a whole and the effect
of the compelled statement thereon.”183 Absent government regulation in
compelled speech cases, most district and appellate courts base their
standard of review primarily on whether the speaker’s underlying speech is
commercial in nature.184 Other courts instead select a standard of review

177. Id.
178. Id. at 717.
179. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561
(1980).
180. See Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional
Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 772–73 (1999) (explaining the lack of
uniformity in defining these terms); Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech,
48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 5 (2000) (noting that the boundaries between commercial and noncommercial speech are “quite blurred”); Keighley, supra note 11, at 2365 (“[I]t is assuredly
difficult to develop a precise definition of commercial speech . . . .”).
181. Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 431 (M.D.N.C. 2011), aff’d, 706 F. 3d 345 (4th Cir.
2013).
182. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
183. Id. at 796.
184. See, e.g., Evergreen Ass’n v. City of N.Y., 801 F. Supp. 2d 197, 204–07 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(finding that the plaintiff’s speech was not commercial in nature), aff’d in part, vacated in part,
No. 11-2735-CV, 2014 WL 184993 (2d Cir. Jan. 17, 2014); Greater Baltimore Ctr. for Pregnancy
Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 683 F.3d 539, 555 (4th Cir. 2012) (concluding that the
Pregnancy Center’s speech was non-commercial and thus subject to strict scrutiny), aff’d in part,
vacated in part en banc, 721 F.3d 264, 280 (4th Cir. 2013) (noting that the court below granted
summary judgment without making an adequate determination of whether the speech was
commercial or non-commercial).
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based on the commercial or non-commercial nature of the speech that has
been compelled by the state.185
A second point of contention is the extent to which the ideological
nature of a speaker’s underlying message transforms the speech from
commercial to non-commercial. Some courts have determined, for
example, that in counseling women against abortion, speech by crisis
pregnancy centers constitutes non-commercial speech.186 This is in part
because the centers’ counseling is “informed by a religious and political
belief[,]” rendering it ideological in nature.187 That said, the Supreme Court
has “consistently held that advertising does not automatically lose its
character as commercial speech simply because it may do much more than
propose a transaction or disseminate purely factual information.”188
Regulations of truthful and non-deceptive commercial speech189 are
generally subject to the intermediate standard of scrutiny first set forth in
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New
York, a case that challenged a New York ban on promotional advertising.190
185. In Stuart, for example, the District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina found
that because the ultrasound “speech-and-display” requirements compelled physicians to convey a
non-medical (and therefore, non-commercial) message, the ultrasound law was therefore subject
to strict scrutiny. 834 F. Supp. 2d at 431–33; see also Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cnty., 683 F.3d.
591, 594 (4th Cir. 2012) (reasoning that a regulation which requires crisis pregnancy centers to
disclose whether they have licensed medical professionals on staff, and post a statement
specifying that the local health department encourages women to consult with a licensed medical
professional, compels non-commercial speech and should therefore be subject to strict scrutiny),
aff’d en banc, 722 F. 3d 184 (4th Cir. 2013); Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v.
Lakey, 806 F. Supp. 2d 942, 970 (W.D. Tex. 2011) (finding that “[a]lthough physicians often have
a commercial interest in a woman’s decision to get an abortion, the Act compels speech that is, at
best, unrelated to a physician’s commercial motivations, and that is, in reality, likely to be adverse
to those motivations”), vacated in part, 667 F.3d 570, 575–80 (5th Cir. 2012) (outlining a host of
reasons why the Act has greater commercial motivations than the court below recognized).
186. See, e.g., Greater Baltimore Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc., 683 F.3d at 554
(explaining that “[t]his kind of ideologically driven speech has routinely been afforded the highest
levels of First Amendment protection, even when accompanied by offers of commercially
valuable services”); Evergreen Ass’n, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 205 (noting that “plaintiff’s missions—
and by extension their charitable work—are grounded in their opposition to abortion and
emergency contraception”).
187. Greater Baltimore. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc., 683 F.3d at 554.
188. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 491 n.6 (1997) (Souter, J.,
dissenting). Expanding on this point, the Court continued,
[t]he concept of commercial speech would be reduced to a relic if the threshold for
imposing strict scrutiny were reached simply because certain advertisements evoke
vaguely nostalgic themes of indeterminate political import or because the
hypersensitive may see the specter of sex in the film of a child eating a peach.
Id.
189. The state may freely regulate and restrict commercial speech that is false, deceptive, or
concerns unlawful activity. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985).
190. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).

2014]

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF HEALTH CAMPAIGNS

491

Intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson establishes that a state may
regulate commercial speech where the following four factors are present:
(1) “the expression is protected by the First Amendment”; (2) the state can
identify a substantial interest; (3) “the regulation directly advances” this
interest; and (4) the regulation is “no[] more extensive than []necessary to
serve [this] interest.”191 In a later case, Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, the Supreme Court considered whether the Central Hudson test
would also apply to cases where speech is compelled, rather than
prohibited, by the government.192 In Zauderer, the petitioner challenged an
Ohio disciplinary rule requiring that attorney advertisements that mention
contingency fees also disclose how those fees are calculated. The Court
described the case as dealing with “purely factual and uncontroversial
information” about the nature of a commercial transaction.193 The Supreme
Court found that an advertiser’s interest in not providing factual
information is minimal, particularly where the state maintains an interest in
preventing consumer confusion or deception.194 While recognizing that
“unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements” might be
unconstitutional if they chill protected commercial speech, the Court
concluded that mandated disclosure requirements are generally permissible
where the disclosures “are reasonably related to the State’s interest in
preventing deception of consumers.”195 This test, which depends on a
finding that the state’s compelled message is “purely factual and
uncontroversial,” is seemingly consistent with Wooley’s prohibition on
compelled ideological speech in non-commercial contexts.196
Scholarly and judicial interpretations of Zauderer vary widely.
Commentators and courts disagree as to whether rational basis review under
Zauderer applies only when the state has an interest in preventing consumer
deception, or whether the state may also compel speech to further other

191. Id. While some refer to the last prong of the Central Hudson test as a “least restrictive
alternative” test, I prefer to use precise language used by the Court, which requires that the
regulation be “no more extensive than necessary[.]” Id. at 569–70.
192. 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. This test is closer to rational basis review than it is to intermediate review. Id. at 652
n.14.
196. 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977). See also Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 849–50
(9th Cir. 2003) (holding that even in the commercial speech context, the state may not “require an
individual to disseminate an ideological message,” but finding that an EPA education campaign
did not fall within this narrow category of ideological speech); Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell,
272 F.3d 104, 114 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that “[r]equired disclosure of accurate, factual
commercial information presents little risk that the state is forcing speakers to adopt disagreeable
state-sanctioned positions”).
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rational interests.197 Some courts and scholars interpret Zauderer as leaving
open the possibility of analyzing compelled speech requirements under
Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny standard.198 Another debated issue
is whether Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny test applies only to
speech restrictions, or whether it also applies to compelled speech.199 The
Supreme Court has never directly addressed these questions, thus the
resolution of these standards remains unclear.
A final consideration in analyzing the First Amendment claims of
compelled speech, unique to the pre-abortion ultrasound requirements, is
the issue of professional speech. Many commentators have noted that
speech by professionals, such as doctors and lawyers in the course of their
professional practice, differs in substantial respect from traditional
commercial speech, and therefore should be treated differently under the
First Amendment.200 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has provided very

197. Compare Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n, 272 F.3d at 115 (applying Zauderer where the purpose
of compelled speech was “increasing consumer awareness of the presence of mercury in a variety
of products[,]” rather than preventing deception), with Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc.,
521 U.S. 457, 491 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that Zauderer is inapplicable where a
speech mandate is unrelated to an interest in preventing consumer deception), and R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1213–17 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (rejecting Zauderer scrutiny in
part because there was no evidence of misleading or deceptive cigarette packaging). See also
Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1081–82 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (finding
no evidence of consumer confusion under Zauderer); Jennifer Keighley, Can You Handle the
Truth? Compelled Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 539,
558–59 (2012) (suggesting that, “[r]ather than listing the various ultimate goals besides curing
consumer deception that should qualify for rational basis review, the test can in fact be reduced to
a much simpler inquiry into the state’s immediate purpose in compelling the speech”).
198. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1217–21 (noting that “because this case also
involves a compelled commercial disclosure, we . . . apply the intermediate standard set forth in
Central Hudson”); Keighley, supra note 197, at 586–89 (arguing that “compelled normative
speech” is not purely factual and uncontroversial, and therefore should be analyzed under Central
Hudson intermediate scrutiny).
199. See Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of
Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 978–79 (2007) (concluding that the
distinction between prohibition and compulsion is not of particular importance, and observing
“[i]f First Amendment concerns arise whenever the state proscribes physician speech . . . ,
constitutional questions should also arise if the state corrupts physician speech by requiring
doctors to transmit misleading information in the context of informed consent”).
200. See Halberstam, supra note 180, at 772 (arguing that the professional “fulfills a more
defined social role by offering specific knowledge and expertise to an audience that deliberately
seeks access to such information and often to the professional’s judgment about a particular
issue”); Keighley, supra note 11, at 2351 (proposing an alternative model of review for
physicians’ speech under the First Amendment); Post, supra note 199, at 950 (“[I]n the context of
medical practice we insist upon competence, not debate, and so we subject professional speech to
an entirely different regulatory regime.”).
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little guidance on this issue.201 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey is one of the few cases in which the Court has
directly addressed the First Amendment protections available to speakers
within the medical profession; however, the Court’s guidance is somewhat
limited and arguably inconsistent.202 In Casey, the Supreme Court held that
the physician’s First Amendment right not to speak is implicated “only as
part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and
regulation by the State.”203 The Court cited only two cases in support of
this proposition: Wooley, which established a strict scrutiny standard for
compelled non-commercial speech;204 and Whalen v. Roe,205which
described physicians’ constitutional challenge to a statute requiring
reporting of patient information relating to prescription drugs as “clearly
frivolous.”206 Neither Wooley nor Whalen provides useful guidance with
respect to the scope of professionals’ First Amendment rights.
In outlining First Amendment standards of review, the purpose of this
Article is not to suggest which standard is most applicable in the contexts of
tobacco labeling and pre-abortion ultrasounds.207 Rather, its purpose is
merely to determine whether any of the available standards for evaluating
the constitutionality of compelled speech might take into account
considerations of whether the compelled speech is aimed at triggering an
emotional response. The following analysis of existing precedent in the
tobacco and ultrasound cases leads to the conclusion that these concerns are
rarely considered in a consistent fashion.
201. Halberstam, supra note 180, at 834 (stating that “the Supreme Court and lower courts
have rarely addressed the First Amendment contours of a professional’s freedom to speak to a
client”).
202. Id. at 874 (articulating an undue burden standard for regulations interfering with a
woman’s ability to obtain an abortion). For a general critique of Casey’s approach to professional
speech, see Halberstam, supra note 180, at 834; Keighley, supra note 11, at 2351; Post, supra note
199, at 979.
203. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992).
204. 430 U.S. 705, 715–16 (1977).
205. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
206. Id. at 604.
207. The decisions in the tobacco and ultrasound lawsuits offer concrete examples of how
courts choose between these various standards of scrutiny. Compare the approaches taken by the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in R.J. Reynolds (rejecting Zauderer scrutiny in favor of Central
Hudson) and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Discount Tobacco (applying Zauderer
scrutiny), with those taken by the Middle District of North Carolina in Stuart (rejecting the Casey
standard and applying strict scrutiny), and the Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Fifth Circuits
(applying Casey). See also Leslie Gielow Jacobs, What the Abortion Disclosure Cases Say About
the Constitutionality of Persuasive Government Speech on Product Labels, 87 DENV. U. L. REV.
855, 858 (2010) (arguing that while “it is not clear what level of scrutiny should apply” to the
tobacco cases, the same standard of scrutiny should be applied in both the tobacco and abortion
contexts).
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1. Compelled Noncommercial Speech: Strict Scrutiny
Of the four lawsuits that have resulted in substantive decisions in the
tobacco and ultrasound contexts, only one court has determined that strict
scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review. In Stuart v. Huff, the Middle
District of North Carolina determined that the state’s “speech-and-display”
ultrasound requirements compelled physicians to convey a nonmedical, and
therefore noncommercial, message, and thus were subject to strict
scrutiny.208 According to the evidence before the court, there was “no
medical purpose for requiring the speaking or showing of this material to an
unwilling listener.”209 While recognizing that the informed consent process
may involve some commercial or professional speech, the court held that
such speech was “inextricably intertwined” with noncommercial speech,
and therefore subject to the highest level of First Amendment scrutiny.210
Strict scrutiny requires a determination of whether the compelled
speech at issue is narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest.211
In conducting this inquiry, the court presumably might consider the
emotional impact of the mandated message.212 If a state is seeking to
persuade women to carry their pregnancies to term, compelling physician
speech is but one of a variety of options from which the state may choose.
If compelling speech is significantly more intrusive than other options
available to the state, a court might find that the speech law does not satisfy
strict scrutiny.213 Moreover, even if the state does succeed in demonstrating
a compelling need for a physician speech mandate, the nature of this
mandate may vary. For example, the state may be required to choose

208. 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 432 (M.D.N.C. 2011), aff’d, 706 F. 3d 345 (4th Cir. 2013); see also
Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cnty., 683 F.3d. 591, 594 (4th Cir. 2012) (stating that strict scrutiny is
the appropriate standard for analyzing the constitutionality of the medical center’s abortion
policies), aff’d en banc, 722 F.3d 184 (4th Cir. 2013); Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion
Servs. v. Lakey, 806 F. Supp. 2d 942, 975 (W.D. Tex. 2011) (finding that, in advancing an
ideological agenda, the Act did not meet the burden of satisfying strict scrutiny), vacated in part,
667 F.3d 570, 575 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that the court below erred in choosing to apply strict
scrutiny).
209. Stuart, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 432 n.7.
210. Id. at 431 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
211. Id. at 432.
212. In Stuart, for example, the state argued, albeit unsuccessfully, that the “state has an
interest in protecting abortion patients from psychological and emotional distress and that this
interest justifies the speech—and—display requirements.” Id.
213. In Stuart, the court found that the Act went “well beyond requiring disclosure of those
items traditionally a part of the informed consent process,” and that, although the state may have a
compelling interest, the Act did not survive strict scrutiny. Id. at 431–32.
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between compelling messages that are emotionally triggering for the
listener and arguably ideological, and those that are more fact-based.214
The District Court in Stuart did consider the emotional impact of the
state’s persuasive message, but not for the reasons described above. When
passing its abortion ultrasound law, North Carolina identified its primary
interest as “protecting abortion patients from psychological and emotional
distress” related to abortion.215 Because the state, in defining its interest,
explicitly highlighted the emotional state of patients seeking abortions, the
court was called upon to evaluate the validity of using a compelled
ultrasound law to further this interest. In fact, the district court concluded
that the evidence before it directly contradicted the state’s assertion,
specifically finding that ultrasound requirements were likely to harm, rather
than improve, “the psychological health of the very group the state purports
to protect.”216 Because the compelled ultrasound law was likely to lead to
psychological harm, the court held that it was not narrowly tailored to
further the state’s compelling interest and therefore did not satisfy strict
scrutiny.217
Notably, the district court’s consideration of the emotional impact of
the state’s message in Stuart was necessary only because the state itself had
highlighted emotional harm in its discussion of state interests.218 Had the
state not mentioned the psychological impact of abortion on women,
focusing instead on a different interest such as reducing abortion rates
overall, it is unlikely that the court would have looked to the emotional
impact of ultrasound images in evaluating the law’s constitutionality.
Nevertheless, those with ethical objections to emotional persuasion may
have missed their opportunity to argue, as part of a strict scrutiny analysis,
that the use of emotionally compelling images might not be a narrowly
tailored means of achieving the state’s goals.219
2. Compelled Commercial Speech: Zauderer
The two appellate courts that have considered substantive challenges
to the FDA’s new tobacco labeling regulations have found that they fall

214. See Keighley, supra note 11, at 2386 (arguing that there is a heightened concern when the
state uses “ambiguous ideological messages”).
215. Stuart, 834 F. Supp. 2d at 432.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 432–33.
218. See id. at 432 (discussing “psychological and emotional distress” in particular).
219. See infra Part V.B.2.
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squarely within the category of commercial speech.220 Both courts began
their analyses by considering whether the regulations satisfied the Zauderer
test for compelled commercial speech, which requires the state to
demonstrate that the compelled speech is purely factual, uncontroversial,
and in furtherance of a substantial government interest.221 The courts,
however, diverged in their conclusions. The Sixth Circuit, in Discount
Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, found that the tobacco
disclosures were purely factual and uncontroversial, and therefore that
Zauderer scrutiny applied.222 In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia rejected Zauderer scrutiny on the grounds that the
images selected by the FDA were not “purely factual, accurate, or
uncontroversial.”223
More importantly for the purposes of this Article, however, the courts
also took differing approaches in considering the relevance of the emotional
impact of the FDA’s messages. Only the D.C. Court of Appeals found that
the issue of emotion affected its resolution of the Zauderer test.224
According to the court in R.J. Reynolds, the images selected by the FDA
were not purely factual and uncontroversial statements, in part because the
FDA itself conceded that the images were meant to be understood
symbolically, rather than literally.225 The court further emphasized that the
FDA’s primary purpose in conveying these images was to “evoke an
emotional response”226 and that such “inflammatory” and “unabashed
attempts to evoke emotion (and perhaps embarrassment) . . . certainly do
not impart purely factual, accurate, or uncontroversial information to
consumers.”227
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit in Discount Tobacco expressly rejected
such an analysis when it concluded that the graphic tobacco labels do not
run afoul of Zauderer’s requirement that disclosures be purely factual.228 It
220. See Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 550 (6th Cir.
2012) (stating that tobacco disclosures and advertisements “clearly fall with[in] the category of
commercial speech”); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d. 1205, 1214–15 (D.C. Cir.
2012) (concluding that disclosure requirements, which are appropriate when regulating
commercial speech, apply to both cigarette advertisements and cigarette packages).
221. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985).
222. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc., 674 F.3d at 560–61.
223. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1217.
224. Id. at 1216–17 (holding that because many of the images at issue are simply attempts to
convey emotional responses and embarrass consumers to quit smoking, these disclosures are not
impartial and therefore fall outside the ambit of Zauderer).
225. Id. at 1216.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1216–17.
228. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 552 (6th Cir. 2012).
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cited the Supreme Court’s rejection in Zauderer of the state’s argument that
illustrations could be used “to play on the emotions . . . and convey false
impressions.”229 The Court in Zauderer recognized that images “serve[]
important communicative functions,” such as “attract[ing] the attention of
the audience to the advertiser’s message,” and expressly foreclosed the
argument that the compelled images might be prohibited on the basis of
their emotional resonance.230 Thus, the Sixth Circuit concluded that
disclosures promoting a “visceral response” do not necessarily fall outside
Zauderer’s purview.231 The court wrote:
Facts can disconcert, displease, provoke an emotional response,
spark controversy, and even overwhelm reason, but that does not
magically turn such facts into opinions. As set forth above,
whether a disclosure is scrutinized under Zauderer turns on
whether the disclosure conveys factual information or an opinion,
not on whether the disclosure emotionally affects its audience or
incites controversy.232
A dissenting judge, however, disagreed and argued that attempts to frighten
consumers or “flagrantly manipulate [their] emotions” do not (in contrast to
drug labeling requirements, for example) present purely factual and
objective information.233
The contrast between the two courts’ approaches suggests that there is
a legitimate dispute about whether Zauderer’s “purely factual and
uncontroversial” requirement can be satisfied when compelled speech or
imagery is aimed at provoking an emotional response in the viewer. As
further developed in Part V.B.1, this Article argues that considerations of
emotional influence are indeed relevant to the determination of whether
compelled speech is factual and uncontroversial.
229. Id. at 560 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
230. Id. (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 647 (1985)).
231. Id. at 569. In other contexts, as well, courts have analyzed Zauderer’s “purely factual
and uncontroversial” requirement by distinguishing between pure facts and subjective opinions,
not between factual communications and emotional communications. See, e.g., Video Software
Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 965–67 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that video game
packaging that includes an “18” sticker does not convey factual information); Entm’t Software
Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1081 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (same); see also Dex Media
West, Inc. v. Seattle, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1287–88 (W.D. Wash. 2011) (rejecting petitioners’
argument that a compelled message informing residents of availability of an opt-out program for
yellow pages distribution sent a normative message about the value of recycling yellow pages);
New York State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, No. 08-Civ-1000, 2008 WL 1752455, at
*9 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (contrasting compelled disclosure of calorie counts on fast food menus with
an impermissible hypothetical alternative—a “statement . . . regarding the relative nutritional
importance of calories or whether a food purchaser ought to consider this information”).
232. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc., 674 F. 3d at 569.
233. Id. at 527–29 (Clay, J., dissenting).
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3. Commercial Speech Generally: Central Hudson
If compelled speech laws fail Zauderer scrutiny, courts typically go on
to analyze the laws under Central Hudson, the general test applicable to
government regulation of commercial speech.234 The Sixth Circuit in
Discount Tobacco understands the test as the following: Central Hudson’s
intermediate level of scrutiny permits government regulation of commercial
speech where the state can identify a substantial interest, the regulation
directly advances this interest, and the regulation is no more extensive than
necessary to serve this interest.235 If courts were to engage in any
consideration of the impact of emotional persuasion, it would likely be in
the third prong of Central Hudson. One might argue, for example, that an
emotionally compelling message is more extensive than necessary to serve
government interests where less provocative messages could achieve the
same result.
The two appellate courts that have considered Central Hudson scrutiny
as applied to the FDA’s graphic tobacco labels have not, however, taken
this approach. In R.J. Reynolds, for example, the court’s analysis of the
second and third prongs of Central Hudson focused exclusively on whether
there was sufficient evidence to support the FDA’s contention that the
inclusion of graphic images on cigarette packaging actually resulted in
decreased smoking rates.236 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals concluded
that the available evidence, based primarily on Canadian studies, did not
support this claim and therefore the FDA labeling regulations failed Central
Hudson scrutiny.237 In Discount Tobacco, the Sixth Circuit also focused on
the actual effectiveness of the images when determining whether the laws
directly advanced the government interest in the least extensive way
possible.238
In dissent, however, Judge Clay argued that “the inclusion of color
graphic warning labels” was not a reasonably tailored response to address
the harms the government sought to prevent because the labels were aimed
at “flagrantly manipulat[ing] the emotions of consumers.”239 Thus, while
one might expect courts to give some credence to claims that the display of
emotionally compelling images is not a tailored enough means of advancing

234. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
235. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc., 674 F.3d at 522–23 (majority opinion) (quoting Cent.
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566).
236. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1217–21 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
237. Id. at 1221–22.
238. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc., 674 F.3d at 530–31.
239. Id. at 528–29 (Clay, J., dissenting).
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government interests, such claims have not met with success. In Part V,
this Article will argue that courts applying Central Hudson scrutiny to
emotionally triggering compelled speech ought to consider whether the
speech’s emotional impact causes it to run afoul of the third prong of
Central Hudson.
B. Fourteenth Amendment Challenges
As noted above, the federal courts that have analyzed substantive First
Amendment claims against pre-abortion ultrasound requirements have
opted not to analyze them under the compelled commercial speech
doctrine.240 On one hand, in Stuart, the Middle District of North Carolina
analyzed the “speech-and-display” requirements as compelled noncommercial speech, subject to strict scrutiny.241 On the other hand, the
Fifth Circuit in Lakey applied Casey’s undue burden test to resolve the First
Amendment challenge.242 Indeed, both courts, following Casey’s lead,
conflated the First and Fourteenth Amendment analyses in such a way that
it is now difficult to disentangle the courts’ reasoning on the two issues.243
The Supreme Court in Casey held that pre-viability regulations of
abortion do not violate a woman’s Fourteenth Amendment right to
240. See supra Part IV.A.2.
241. See Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 431–33 (M.D.N.C. 2011) (explaining that, while
the speech contained some commercial elements, the non-commercial elements meant that it
would be subject to strict scrutiny), aff’d, 706 F. 3d 345 (4th Cir. 2013).
242. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 577–80 (5th
Cir. 2012).
243. As recognized both by the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina in
Stuart and by various legal commentators, the analysis of First Amendment claims by reference to
Fourteenth Amendment principles is incorrect as a matter of law. See Stuart, 834 F. Supp. 2d at
430 (“The Court in Casey did not, however, combine the due process/liberty interest analysis with
the First Amendment analysis . . . . It seems unlikely that the Supreme Court decided by
implication that long-established First Amendment law was irrelevant when speech about abortion
is at issue, and this Court declines to so find.”); Scott W. Gaylord & Thomas J. Molony, Casey
and a Woman’s Right to Know: Ultrasounds, Informed Consent, and the First Amendment, 45
CONN. L. REV. 595, 619 (2012) (arguing that the district courts in Lakey and Stuart erred in
interpreting Casey’s undue burden standard as not altering “the Court’s normally high standard of
review for compelled speech”); Keighley, supra note 11, at 2379 (criticizing the Supreme Court’s
conflation of First Amendment and undue burden analyses in Casey); Post, supra note 199, at
978–79 (same). Indeed, it would be odd if a constitutional standard designed for Fourteenth
Amendment violations overrode traditional First Amendment standards—particularly where the
Fourteenth Amendment standard is the weaker one. Consider, for example, an analogy to the
tobacco-labeling context. Could a court legitimately reject tobacco manufacturers’ First
Amendment claims to compelled speech on the ground that the disclosure requirements satisfy the
rational basis test that is applied to state interference with non-fundamental rights, like the right to
smoke? Such an outcome seems unlikely. But see Gaylord & Molony, supra, at 619 (suggesting
that the lower Fourteenth Amendment standard is more appropriate than the higher First
Amendment standard in the context of pre-abortion ultrasounds).
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reproductive privacy so long as they do not place substantial obstacles in
the path of a woman seeking abortion, also known as the “undue burden”
test.244 Casey held that a state may take measures to ensure that a woman’s
abortion decision is informed, even if those measures express the state’s
preference for childbirth over abortion.245 As long as the information
provided is relevant, truthful, and not misleading, it will not constitute an
undue burden on a woman’s due process right to reproductive choice.246
The Court in Casey identified examples of permissible informational
disclosures, including disclosures about “the nature of the abortion
procedure, the attendant health risks and those of childbirth, and the
‘probable gestational age’ of the fetus,” as well as the procedure’s “impact
on the fetus.”247
The “truthful and not misleading” test established by Casey echoes the
“purely factual and uncontroversial” test for First Amendment challenges
under Zauderer. Unlike the D.C. Court of Appeals’ discussion in R.J.
Reynolds, which cited the tobacco images’ emotional impact as evidence
that they were neither factual nor uncontroversial,248 courts considering preabortion disclosure requirements have done so without reference to the
method of state communication or its emotional impact on the patients. In
Eubanks v. Schmidt,249 for example, the Western District of Kentucky
explicitly held that abortion consent brochures including color-enhanced
and enlarged photos are neither misleading nor untruthful.250 In Lakey, the
Fifth Circuit upheld pre-abortion ultrasound requirements as consistent with
Casey, describing them as “medically accurate descriptions [that] are

244. 505 U.S. 833, 876–78 (1992) (“A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the
conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus. A statute with this purpose is invalid
because the means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential life must be calculated to
inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it.”).
245. Id. at 872–73 (finding that, while states should provide a reasonable framework to help
women decide whether to terminate a pregnancy, this same framework could also include
regulations designed to emphasize philosophical and social arguments in favor of carrying the
pregnancy to term).
246. Id. at 882.
247. Id.
248. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 845 F. Supp. 2d 266, 272–73 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(explaining that the negative emotional response evoked by images such as a body on an autopsy
table suggested that their objective was not to help consumers make an informed choice, but rather
to provoke the viewer to quit or never start smoking).
249. 126 F. Supp. 2d 451 (W.D. Ky. 2000).
250. Id. at 459 (“Regardless of their size, photographs do not become misleading so long as
the statutorily required scale allows an average person to determine their actual size. . . . The
pictures provide an accurate rendition of the fetus at various stages of development . . . .”).
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inherently truthful and non-misleading.”251 While the parties252 and
numerous commentators253 had objected to the emotional aspects of the
ultrasound, the Fifth Circuit in Lakey did not consider these arguments.254
Even the Middle District of North Carolina in Stuart, which rejected the
abortion ultrasound law as unconstitutional, failed to address the argument
against emotional persuasion when discussing the distinction between
“factual and informative” speech and “ideological or judgmental speech
concerning philosophical, spiritual, or moral issues.”255
Only one court, in a non-precedential opinion, has suggested that
analyses of abortion disclosure requirements under Casey are lacking if they
do not take into account the emotional impact of the disclosures.256 When
commenting on the Court of Appeals’ 2012 decision to allow a challenge to
the Texas ultrasound law to proceed, Judge Sam Sparks of the Western
District of Texas suggested that the court missed an opportunity to consider
whether other aspects of the informed consent process might pose an undue
burden by virtue of their emotional impact. According to Judge Sparks’
reading of the Fifth Circuit’s opinion, even an “an extended presentation,
consisting of graphic images of aborted fetuses, and heartfelt testimonials
about the horrors of abortion,” would be constitutionally permissible.257

251. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 577 (5th Cir.
2012).
252. See, e.g., Brief of Appellee at 21–22, Lakey, 667 F.3d 570 (No. 1:11-cv-00486-SS)
(alleging that the Act inflicts emotional distress on women by requiring physicians, even against
the patient’s wishes, to deliver a verbal description of the unborn child, display the ultrasound, and
make the heartbeat audible); Complaint at 31, Lakey, 667 F.3d 570 (No. 1:11-cv-0046-SS) (noting
“information that the patient has declined to accept . . . will unnecessarily stress, upset, and/or
anger her as she prepares to undergo a medical procedure”); Amended Complaint at 35, Lakey,
667 F.3d 570 (No. 1:11-cv-0046-SS) (same); Second Amended Complaint at 32, Lakey, 667 F.3d
570 (No. 1:11-cv-0046-SS) (same).
253. See MITCHELL, supra note 89, at 4–5 (objecting to links between the politics of gender
and ultrasound that make such images inseparable from notions of women and power); Borgmann,
supra note 89, at 320–25 (explaining that ultrasound statutes force a woman to see her baby’s
image and undermine her feeling of control regarding the profoundly personal circumstance of
unintended pregnancy); Rocha, supra note 89, at 38 (objecting to the ultrasound as an emotional
appeal that attempts to dictate how women should deliberate over the abortion choice); Sanger,
supra note 79, at 396–97 (commenting that forcing a woman to view her ultrasound in order to
change her mind about having an abortion is not an appeal to reason but rather an attempt to
overpower it).
254. See Lakey, 667 F.3d at 574–84 (considering instead, the appellees’ argument that the
ultrasound requirement violates the First Amendment by requiring a medically unnecessary
procedure to convey an ideological message, or uses unconstitutionally vague statutory language).
255. 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 429 n.4 (M.D.N.C. 2011), aff’d, 706 F. 3d 345 (4th Cir. 2013).
256. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, No. A-11-CA-486-SS, 2012
WL 373132, at *3 (W.D. Tex. 2012).
257. Id. at *3.
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This Article argues that Judge Sparks’ argument has merit, and discusses it
further in Part V.B.3.
V. THE EMOTIONAL IMPACT OF IMAGERY CAN AND SHOULD BE
CONSIDERED AS PART OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSES
Part IV explored the various standards of scrutiny that federal courts
have applied when adjudicating the constitutionality of tobacco labeling and
abortion ultrasound laws. It also highlighted the few instances in which
judges have taken arguments against emotional persuasion into account
when applying these standards of scrutiny. This section argues that, despite
a paucity of consistent judicial recognition, there is room within the
constitutional analysis of the tobacco and ultrasound cases to incorporate
arguments that the state’s use of emotionally laden imagery in compelled
speech contexts violates constitutional norms. Moreover, it demonstrates
that such arguments are, in fact, consistent with First Amendment
jurisprudence relating to the use of symbols and images in speech.
A. Supreme Court Precedent Recognizes the Distinctive Power of
Images in Its Free Speech Jurisprudence
Language used by the Supreme Court in some of its most prominent
First Amendment decisions reinforces the idea that certain types of imagebased appeals, when compelled by the government, may pose a greater risk
of First Amendment violations. Throughout its jurisprudence, the Court has
recognized the unique power that images and symbols have over viewers.258
While it has explicitly rejected the idea that words and images ought to
receive different levels of First Amendment protection, a careful reading of
its leading free speech opinions finds support for the notion that images are
capable of more direct communication, and therefore more direct harms and
benefits, than words.
Amy Adler’s work on First Amendment law’s treatment of images and
artwork is instructive in this regard. Adler argues that First Amendment
law “consistently and unthinkingly offers more protection to text than to
image.”259 According to Adler, this preference, which is “often assumed
but almost never acknowledged,”260 is based on the perception that visual
images are more powerful, less rational, less controllable, and therefore

258. See Adler, supra note 38, at 56 (recounting the Court’s acknowledgement of the visual
symbol of the U.S. flag as being “ so powerful it may overpower the speaker”).
259. Id. at 42.
260. Id.
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more dangerous than verbal speech.261 In support of this contention, she
cites not only obscenity and child pornography laws’ focus on pictorial
pornography, but also the Supreme Court’s treatment of symbols like the
American flag.262 Indeed, a careful look at the jurisprudence in these areas
reinforces Adler’s interpretation.
1. Images Are Less Rational, More Emotional
Obscenity law, for one, routinely permits the restriction of imagebased obscene speech while leaving textual pornography unaltered.263 In
the Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in Kaplan v. California,264 for example,
a case dealing with a bookstore’s sale of non-illustrated books containing
explicitly sexual material, the Court made such a distinction, albeit
cautiously.265 The Court noted that statutory prohibitions on obscene
expressions may be permissible under the First Amendment regardless of
the “medium of the expression”—that is, whether the expression is pictorial
or text-based.266 It also recognized, however, that restraints on the printed
word are typically more difficult to justify; as Justice Burger wrote: “A
book seems to have a different and preferred place in our hierarchy of
values, and so it should be.”267 The Court did not explain precisely why it
made this distinction, but Adler posits that the Court did so on the basis of

261. Id.; see also Amy Adler, The Thirty-Ninth Annual Edward G. Donley Memorial
Lectures: The Art of Censorship, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 205, 217 (2000) (“Visual images are
frequently perceived as more powerful and less controllable than verbal speech. They do not fit
comfortably within our current notion of a reasoned, rational marketplace of ideas.”).
262. Adler, supra note 38, at 42.
263. See id. at 52 (“Child pornography law governs only ‘visual depictions’ of child sexual
conduct. Words can never be child pornography, no matter how gruesome and sexually explicit
they might be.”); Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, A War over Words: An Inside Analysis and
Examination of the Prosecution of the Red Rose Stories & Obscenity Law, 16 J. L. & POL’Y 177,
189–91 (2007) (discussing a 2006 Western District of Pennsylvania obscenity prosecution of the
“‘written word,’ i.e. non-pictorial works” and noting that there have been no prosecutions of nonpictorial works since 1973); Robert A. Jacobs, Dirty Words, Dirty Thoughts and Censorship:
Obscenity Law and Non-Pictorial Works, 21 SW. U. L. REV. 155, 176–177 (1992) (noting the
infrequency of obscenity prosecution of non-pictorial works since Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15 (1973)).
264. 413 U.S. 115 (1973).
265. See id. at 118–19 (explaining that although obscenity can manifest itself in the written
and oral description of conduct, “a profound commitment to protecting communication of ideas”
prevents restraint of textual expression).
266. Id. at 119.
267. Id.; see also Landau v. Fording, 54 Cal. Rptr. 177, 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966), aff’d, 388
U.S. 456 (1967) (stating that “[b]ecause of the nature of the medium, we think a motion picture of
sexual scenes may transcend the bounds of the constitutional guarantee long before a frank
description of the same scenes in the written word”).
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unspoken assumptions about the power of imagery.268 Furthermore, as
Adler writes, “[Justice] Burger seems to envision the category of pictures
itself as flagrant and debased,” which reflects longstanding anxieties and
concerns that “images are lowly, sensual, and divorced from the realm of
reason and ideas; they are so connected with our body and our senses that
pictures become fused with what they represent.”269
The Supreme Court has recognized the idea of symbols and images as
bypassing rationality and short-circuiting reason in its compelled speech
jurisprudence as well. In West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette,270 for example, Justice Jackson expressed concern that requiring
students to salute the American flag, rather than informing them of its
meaning through more traditional textual communications, is merely a
“short-cut” to bypass the “slow and easily neglected route to aroused
[patriotic] loyalties.”271 The Court described symbols like emblems and
flags as creating “a short cut from mind to mind” and held that compelling
individuals to make gestures of respect toward these symbols violates their
First Amendment rights just as surely as a compelled statement of belief.272
Even outside of constitutional law, scholars have recognized that the
law’s aspiration toward rational thought has effectively denigrated the value
of images. For instance, as Neal Feigenson and Christina Spiesel illustrate,
American law “has tended to identify [] rationality (and hence its virtue)
with texts rather than pictures, with reading words rather than ‘reading’
pictures.”273 Rebecca Tushnet likewise cites the arational power of images
to explain why “[j]udges and scholars are powerfully motivated to disavow
‘judging’” artistic images in copyright and other contexts: “Images seem
especially dangerous because their power is irrational.”274 This focus on the
arational power of images ties neatly into the arguments described in Part
III against the state’s use of emotional persuasion.

268. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 38, at 46 (explaining that “the Court’s opinion was
maddening in its failure to explain or justify its distinction between words and images” and that
“deep but unspoken assumptions about both the meaning of the First Amendment and about the
distinction between text and image underlie [Chief Justice] Burger’s assertion”).
269. Id. at 47; see also Adler, supra note 261, at 210 (citing Catherine MacKinnon’s theory
that pictorial pornography is more dangerous to women than textual pornography).
270. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
271. Id. at 631.
272. Id. at 631–32.
273. Tushnet, supra note 117, at 689 (citing NEAL FEIGENSON & CHRISTINA SPIESEL, LAW
ON DISPLAY 4 (2009)).
274. Id. at 693–94.
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2. Images Are Less Controllable
In its compelled speech cases, the Court has also expressed concern
that the use of imagery to communicate substantive messages is troubling
because images are inherently subject to various interpretations. In both
Barnette and Texas v. Johnson,275 state laws compelled adherence to a
particular symbol—the American flag—and emphasized a particular
reading of this symbol.276
The Supreme Court found both laws
unconstitutional, and its reasons for so finding were very much tied to the
unique power that images have over observers and the inappropriateness of
the state’s reliance on this power to communicate a message.
Echoing the findings of researchers who suggest that viewers may
interpret images differently depending on their background and context,277
Justice Jackson noted in Barnette that “[a] person gets from a symbol the
meaning he puts into it, and what is one man’s comfort and inspiration is
another’s jest and scorn.”278 Because viewers’ interpretations of a given
image can and do vary, the Court held in both Barnette and Johnson that it
is unconstitutional for a state to compel only one interpretation of an imagebased message.279 In Johnson, for example, the Supreme Court overturned
the conviction of a man who burned the American flag in protest, thus
violating a Texas law prohibiting desecration of the flag.280 In finding that
flag burning constituted expressive conduct just as surely as speech, the
Court highlighted the nature of the flag as a visual symbol—a “‘visible
manifestation of two hundred years of nationhood’” and an object
“[p]regnant with expressive content.”281 As the Court noted, it had “never
275. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
276. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 626–29 (1943) (noting that
West Virginia law mandated that school children salute the flag and recite the pledge of
allegiance, and allowed expulsion of children who violated that law); Johnson, 491 U.S. at 399–
400 (noting that Texas law considered burning the American flag a sign of disrespect that was
criminally punishable).
277. See infra Part V.B.
278. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 632–33; see also Johnson, 491 U.S. at 410 (stating that “[t]he
State, apparently, is concerned that such conduct will lead people to believe either that the flag
does not stand for nationhood and national unity, but instead reflects other, less positive concepts,
or that the concepts reflected in the flag do not in fact exist, that is, that we do not enjoy unity as a
Nation”).
279. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 632–34 (explaining that the same symbols can be interpreted
differently, and thus a symbol of nationalism will take on various interpretations for different
individuals); Johnson, 491 U.S. at 416–17 (noting that to prohibit flag burning for political
purposes, but not for ceremonial purposes, would allow one to “burn the flag to convey one’s
attitude toward it and its referents only if one does not endanger the flag’s representation of
nationhood”).
280. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 399, 420.
281. Id. at 405.
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before [] held that the Government may ensure that a symbol be used to
express only one view of that symbol or its referents.”282
Indeed, public criticism of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Scott v. Harris283 seems grounded in concerns about singular interpretations
of images. In Scott, the Supreme Court relied on a video of a police chase
as representing the truth of an encounter,284 effectively finding that the
video “could be interpreted in only one way.”285 Rebecca Tushnet has
argued that the Court’s failure to recognize alternate interpretations of the
video “conflat[ed] the realistic with the real,” and that this failure led to
erroneous analysis in Scott.286
3. Images Are More Powerful
The compelled speech cases also reflect a sense among Supreme Court
justices that visual images are inherently more emotionally powerful than
words. In her reading of the American flag cases, Adler describes the
Court’s statements about the power of the flag as a type of “idolatry”—a
belief that some symbols or images hold inordinate power beyond the
power of words.287 In Johnson, the Court described the flag as “[p]regnant
with expressive content.”288 Even Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, described
the “mystical reverence” to which people hold the flag. 289 Justice Stevens,
also in dissent, likewise wrote that “[t]he value of the flag as a symbol
cannot be measured.”290 The language used in these cases makes clear that
the Supreme Court views the American flag as being a uniquely impactful
representation of a system of beliefs fundamental to our nation’s history and
progress. The fact that a symbol can hold such power reinforces the idea
that an image can do the same.291

282. Id. at 417.
283. 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
284. See id. at 378–81 (describing the videotape as the “added wrinkle” in the case).
285. Tushnet, supra note 117, at 700–01.
286. Id. at 701 (citing Dan Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris
and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 841 (2009)).
287. Adler, supra note 38, at 43–44.
288. 491 U.S. 397, 405 (1989).
289. Id. at 429 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
290. Id. at 437 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
291. Regardless, there seems to be a contradiction in how the Court treats cases of imagebased speech. In the obscenity cases, the Supreme Court seems to view the images as “devoid of
any real meaning.” Calvert & Richards, supra note 263, at 221. Likewise, a dissent in one of the
flag cases correlates the action of burning it not as an expression of an idea, but rather as an
“inarticulate grunt or roar . . . indulged in . . . to antagonize others.” Johnson, 491 U.S. at 432
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). As Justice Rehnquist noted, Johnson, a flag burner, could have
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Adler ultimately argues that images, because of their unique nature,
should receive greater First Amendment protection than they currently do—
that image-based pornography, for example, should be defended just as
vigorously as textual pornography.292 If Adler’s argument is correct, then
perhaps the converse ought to be true in the context of governmentcompelled speech. Because image-based communications are less rational,
less controllable, and more powerful than textual communications, the
Supreme Court ought to be particularly wary when state actors compel
these communications.293 Indeed, the Court’s jurisprudence in the flag
cases supports this argument. In these contexts, at least, constitutional law
has recognized the fact that images are a unique, arational form of
communication and has treated the compelled use of images with less
deference. This history may suggest that there is some implicit precedent
for affording emotionally triggering images less First Amendment
protection. Thus, when the government wishes to use such images to
persuade, perhaps it ought to face a higher burden.
B. First and Fourteenth Amendment Standards of Scrutiny Can
Accommodate Concerns About the Emotional Impact of Imagery
To date, only one court, of those that have reached substantive
conclusions about the constitutionality of the FDA’s tobacco labeling
regulations and state pre-abortion ultrasound laws, has set precedent that
takes into account the emotional impact of state-compelled imagery.294 In
expressed his opinion in many different ways, but it was his use of a symbolic image with which
to make his point that suggested he should lose his First Amendment protections. Id.
292. Adler, supra note 38, at 43.
293. See Tushnet, supra note 117, at 696 (noting that, “for example, victim impact statements
used at criminal sentencing now may incorporate video, sometimes set to haunting music, with
resulting controversy over whether such presentations irrationally influence sentencing juries”).
294. In other contexts, too, courts have been unwilling to find that the emotional impact of
speech is enough to render the speech less worthy of First Amendment protection. In Snyder v.
Phelps, for example, the Supreme Court asked whether the First Amendment prohibited holding
Westboro Baptist liable in tort for picketing and making emotionally triggering statements at a
service member’s funeral. 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1213 (2011). It concluded that such speech, though
hurtful to the family, was constitutionally protected. Id. at 1220. Because “any distress
occasioned by Westboro’s picketing turned on the content and viewpoint of the message
conveyed, rather than any interference with the funeral itself,” the Court held that prohibition of
such speech was not a legitimate time, place, and manner regulation. Id. at 1217–19. While the
case did not deal with either compelled speech or commercial speech, it demonstrates that the
Supreme Court has not traditionally considered the emotional impact of private speech as relevant
to its constitutionality. Even in cases where the Court has considered the emotional harm
resulting from commercial speech, its conclusions have not rested on the objectionable emotional
content of the speech itself, but rather its impact on the industry the law seeks to regulate. In
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., a case evaluating laws that prohibit attorneys from soliciting
clients within thirty days of an accident, the Court noted that “[t]he Bar is concerned not with
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R.J. Reynolds, the D.C. Court of Appeals cited the inflammatory emotional
impact of graphic tobacco warnings to support its conclusion that the
Zauderer test, which applies only to purely factual and uncontroversial
compelled speech, was the wrong test to use in this context; the court
ultimately applied the Central Hudson test and did not further consider the
issue of emotional persuasion.295
The First and Fourteenth Amendment tests that apply to these cases,
however, do offer numerous opportunities for considering the perils
associated with compelled imagery that triggers emotional reactions. Four
such proposals, which incorporate supporting empirical evidence from the
social sciences, are explained in further detail below.
1. Truth and Controversy
Under the Zauderer standard, the state may, consistent with the First
Amendment, compel “purely factual and uncontroversial” speech under
certain circumstances.296 Casey interprets the Fourteenth Amendment to
permit laws requiring physicians to communicate “truthful and not
misleading” information that is relevant to a woman’s abortion decision,
even if the information has “no direct relation to her health.”297 Where the
communications in question are images designed to evoke an emotional or a
rational response in viewers, as in the tobacco and ultrasound cases, the
Zauderer and Casey inquiries—whether a compelled statement or image is
factual (rather than opinion-based), uncontroversial (rather than
controversial), truthful (rather than false), and fairly represented (rather than
misleading)—ought to consider the unique characteristics of image-based
speech.
As the D.C. Court of Appeals noted in R.J. Reynolds, emotionally
inflammatory images “cannot rationally be viewed as pure attempts to
convey information” and “certainly do not impart purely factual, accurate,
or uncontroversial information.”298 In dissent, Judge Clay in Discount
Tobacco discussed whether the FDA’s graphic warnings were a “reasonably
tailored” solution to achieve the government’s goals, highlighting the
inconsistency between appealing to emotions by way of graphic imagery

citizens’ ‘offense’ in the abstract, but with the demonstrable detrimental effects that such ‘offense’
has on the profession it regulates.” 515 U.S. 618, 631 (1995) (internal citations omitted).
295. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1216–17 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
296. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
297. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992).
298. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1216–17. Cf. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc.
v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 560 (6th Cir. 2012) (Stranch, J., majority) (“Zauderer itself
eviscerates the argument that a picture or drawing cannot be accurate and factual.”).
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and communicating factual information.299 Not only does the use of
graphic images “evoke a visceral response that subsumes rationale decisionmaking,” Judge Clay wrote, but the interpretation of the images will
inevitably vary from viewer to viewer.300
Judge Clay is correct in noting that images can be interpreted very
differently by various viewers. While the gruesome images selected by the
FDA for cigarette packaging are likely to trigger fear and disgust in all but
the most hardened viewers, not all images are as homogeneously
understood. Fetal ultrasound images are a primary example. While
proponents of pre-abortion ultrasound laws maintain that their goal in
presenting women with ultrasound images and fetal descriptions is to
inspire feelings of love and maternal bonding, women on the receiving end
of this message have interpreted these images very differently.301 For
instance, Dana Weinstein testified in Nova Health Systems v. Pruitt about
her decision to choose abortion after learning that her unborn child had
severe brain damage, which would cause it to be in a persistent vegetative
state upon birth.302 According to Weinstein, “[h]aving to listen to a detailed
description of the ultrasound images would have caused [her] to experience
the shock of the diagnosis all over again and would have intensified the
feelings of grief and disappointment that [she] was struggling to cope
with.”303
Indeed, scientific research has confirmed the fact that women
experience ultrasounds differently.
Women experiencing normal
pregnancies generally interpret the ultrasound event as a positive one; in
contrast, some who experience risky pregnancies and subsequently miscarry
report that they wish they had not seen the fetal image.304 Two studies of
299. See Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc., 674 F.3d at 528 (Clay, J., dissenting) (comparing
the attempt to analogize colorful graphic warnings on tobacco products with extensive textual
warnings on over-the-counter drugs).
300. Id. at 529–530.
301. See generally Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 47–53), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2258742. Corbin
notes that ultrasound images reflect particular social and cultural meanings, representing a
“portrait” of a wanted child. Id. at 49–50. Therefore, she argues, the government’s message
“forc[es] doctors to tell women that their unwanted pregnancy should really be viewed as a
wanted child.” Id. at 50. She argues, however, that “[t]his reading of an ultrasound image is
neither inevitable nor universal” and “most expectant couples need help interpreting the fetal
image.” Id. at 49.
302. Response in Opposition to Defendants’ and Defendant Intervenor’s Joint Motion to
Strike Declarations of Linda Kerber, Ph.D., and Dana Weinstein, and Limit The Testimony of
Marilyn Eldridge and David Grimes, M.D. at 5, Nova Health Sys. v. Pruitt, 292 P.3d 28 (D. Okla.
2012) (No. CV-2010-533), 2012 WL 381843.
303. Id. at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
304. Black, supra note 88, at 49–50.
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women’s responses to the possibility of ultrasound imaging prior to
pregnancy termination likewise showed significant variations in emotional
response.305 In a 2010 study from the United Kingdom, approximately ten
percent of women seeking abortions requested to see the ultrasound image,
often expressing curiosity or a desire to ensure they had made the right
decision, and referring to the experience as part of the grieving process.306
In contrast, almost seventy percent of the women said that they did not want
to view the ultrasound.307 Of these, some believed the image would inspire
feelings of sadness and guilt; others said that the experience would be
unnecessary because they had already reached a decision—one woman said,
“It’s not just my baby.”308 A 2009 Canadian study, however, found that
slightly over seventy-two percent of women seeking abortions opted to
view the ultrasound when offered the opportunity.309 Of these, eighty-three
percent viewed it as a positive experience, reporting reinforcement of their
decision and a sense of closure.310 Others reported mixed feelings; as one
woman noted, “It was interesting but sad.”311
This research lends support to the argument that compelled images are
unlikely to satisfy constitutional tests requiring them to be truthful, factual,
uncontroversial, or not misleading. A contrast with textual messages may
reinforce this point.312 A statement like “smoking can cause lung cancer” is
difficult to misinterpret.313 While some listeners may overestimate the
likelihood of developing cancer as a result of tobacco use while others may
underestimate it,314 both groups would, if asked, be able to accurately
describe the message they received (if only by parroting the words). The
fact that the message may have different effects on listeners’ subsequent
305. Compare Graham et al., supra note 83, at 488 (finding a majority of women did not want
to see ultrasound images because it “could potentially worsen the guilt and emotional turmoil
felt”), with Wiebe & Adams, supra note 82, at 99 (noting most women felt that “viewing the
[ultrasound] did not make it more difficult emotionally”).
306. Graham et al., supra note 83, at 485–86.
307. Id. at 485.
308. Id. at 486 (internal quotation marks omitted).
309. Wiebe & Adams, supra note 82, at 99.
310. Id. at 99–100.
311. Id. at 100 (internal quotation marks omitted).
312. See United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15–16 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(contrasting textual corrective statements about tobacco with the graphic images in R.J. Reynolds).
313. Compare id. at 5 (noting that the defendants were aware of the “‘consensus in the
scientific community that smoking caused lung cancer and other diseases’”), with R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“[T]he image of a man smoking
through a tracheotomy hole might be misinterpreted as suggesting that such a procedure is a
common consequence of smoking—a more logical interpretation than the FDA’s contention that it
symbolizes ‘the addictive nature of cigarettes.’”).
314. Corbin, supra note 301, at 36.
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choices does not negate the fact that listeners would be able to agree
between themselves as to precisely what message was communicated to
them. In contrast, tobacco users viewing pictures of diseased lungs and
women viewing ultrasound images would likely have difficulty agreeing as
to what factual message was being communicated by way of the image.315
A second argument for treating image-based communications as
potentially misleading is grounded in social science research about
cognitive biases. Some legal scholars have argued that when government
communications “attempt[] to exploit mistakes . . . [or] intentionally
exploit[] predictable cognitive errors,” they distort speech by being
misleading.316
In addition, research has shown that image-based
communications are more likely to trigger cognitive biases that detract from
rational reasoning.317
Because images grab one’s attention, people may give them more
attention than they deserve—a prime example of inferential error.318 Rather
than processing emotional and visual information systematically, people
tend to rely on heuristics or stereotypes, cognitive shortcuts for processing
information that simplify decisionmaking at the expense of reasoned
judgment.319 In particular, vivid evidence leading to negative moods is
especially likely to cause errors in reasoning,320 such as perceiving greater

315. See, e.g., Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 530 (6th Cir.
2012) (noting that color graphics can be viewed differently based on individual viewpoints and
ideologies).
316. Corbin, supra note 301, at 17; see also Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism,
35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 47 (2007) (“[I]ndividuals hearing emotionally laden communications
eliciting fear or anxiety may be more susceptible to persuasion by that message.”).
317. See Corbin supra note 301, at 26–27 (noting that the use of images in advertising to elicit
“positive emotional responses . . . exploit[s] a distorting heuristic embedded in people’s
decisionmaking”).
318. See Gold, supra note 155, at 518 (explaining that when evidence is selected for trial
based on its vividness, the jury is exposed to the “danger of inferential error because vividness is
normally only vaguely related to probativeness”).
319. See Neal Feigenson & Jaihyun Park, Emotions and Attributions of Legal Responsibility
and Blame: A Research Review, 30 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 143, 144 (2006) (recognizing that
emotions and moods can “affect people’s strategies for processing information” (emphasis
omitted)); see also Joseph P. Forgas, Affective Influences on Attitudes and Judgments, in
HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE SCIENCES 596, 608 (Richard J. Davidson, Klaus R. Scherer & H. Hill
Goldsmith, eds., 2003) (recognizing that “[w]hen people pay little attention to the message and
rely on simplistic, heuristic processing . . . , the affect often functions as a heuristic cue and
produces a mood-congruent response to the message”).
320. Blumenthal, supra note 75, at 15–16; see also generally John Cryderman & Kevin
Arceneaux, Does Fear Motivate Critical Evaluations of Political Arguments? Emotion and DualProcessing Models of Persuasion (APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper), available at
http://ssrn.com/paper=1644637.
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than actual risk.321 In the context of advertising by tobacco manufacturers,
for example, uniformly positive images of happy smokers exacerbate
optimism bias and distort perceptions of risk.322 Similarly, negative images
presented by the government to counter these advertisements exploit risk
biases.323
Thus, there is merit to the argument that compelled image-based
communications run the risk of violating First and Fourteenth Amendment
constitutional requirements that such communications be factual, truthful,
non-misleading, and uncontroversial.
2. Tailoring to Government Interests
Both strict scrutiny and the Central Hudson tests for First Amendment
violations take into account the strength of the relationship between the
state’s interests and the means used to achieve those interests.324 Strict
scrutiny requires that a governmental speech mandate be narrowly tailored
to further a compelling state interest; intermediate scrutiny under Central
Hudson requires that the regulation directly advance a substantial state
interest in the least extensive way possible. When considering speech
mandates that incorporate emotionally triggering imagery, it is reasonable,
and indeed necessary, to ask whether the government might be able to
achieve its goals through more effective means or through means imposing
less of a burden on speakers and/or listeners.325
In his dissent in Discount Tobacco, Judge Clay argued that the use of
“large scale color graphic[s]” intended to trigger “visceral response[s] that
subsume[] rationale decision-making” is not a reasonably tailored response

321. See Loes T. E. Kessels et al., Increased Attention but More Efficient Disengagement:
Neuroscientific Evidence for Defensive Processing of Threatening Health Information, 29
HEALTH PSYCH. 346, 353 (2010) (concluding that “high-threat smoking pictures capture more
attention processes,” while, at the same time, “caus[ing] more effective disengagement” that could
lead to more defensive behavior and reactions in viewers); Richard L. Wiener et al., supra note
156, at 235 (identifying a study in which participants “provided with information about the risks
of an activity developed negative affect, which in turn led to increased perceptions of risk”).
322. Daniel Romer & Patrick Jamieson, Advertising, Smoker Imagery, and the Diffusion of
Smoking Behavior, in SMOKING: RISK, PERCEPTION, & POLICY 127, 129 (Paul Slovic ed., 2001).
323. Keighley, supra note 11, at 2387.
324. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
325. See, e.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 491 (1995) (finding that “the
availability of alternatives that would prove less intrusive to the First Amendment’s protections
for commercial speech” would be relevant to a Central Hudson analysis); City of Cincinnati v.
Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 n.13 (1993) (“[I]f there are numerous and obvious
less-burdensome alternatives to the restriction on commercial speech, that is certainly a relevant
consideration in determining whether the ‘fit’ between ends and means is reasonable.”).
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for correcting an information deficit among tobacco users.326 According to
Judge Clay, different viewers can interpret images differently, particularly
when they include a subjective component.327 This, combined with the
FDA’s alleged failure to consider other options for achieving its interests,
proved fatal for the FDA in Judge Clay’s Central Hudson analysis.328
Likewise, in Stuart, the Middle District of North Carolina, applying
strict scrutiny, held that even if the state did have a compelling interest, the
statute was not “narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.”329 The court
faulted the state for not considering other alternatives to the mandatory
abortion ultrasound statutes that might nevertheless achieve the state’s
goals, such as offering written information about fetal development or
offering the ultrasound as a voluntary measure.330 These alternatives,
according to the court, would be less burdensome to the physicians whose
speech is compelled, as well as to the listeners subjected to unwanted
images.331
These judicial opinions offer strong justifications for why compelled
visual disclosures, as compared to textual disclosures, might be
insufficiently tailored to the state’s interests and therefore violate the First
Amendment’s restrictions on compelled speech. As noted by Judge Clay in
his dissent, images are subject to a variety of interpretations, which makes it
far less likely that most viewers will be persuaded to act in accordance with
the state’s interests. When viewers interpret a message differently, it may
be difficult to demonstrate that the communication of that message is
sufficiently tailored to achieve the state’s interests. Thus, any inquiry into
an image-based campaign’s effectiveness ought to begin by asking whether
the campaign’s message is likely to be interpreted consistently by a
heterogeneous population.
For example, consider anti-drug advertisements that were criticized in
the late 1990s for portraying drug use as sexy or appealing. Frank Rich of
the New York Times described one of the anti-heroin advertisements:
In this elegantly shot display of high-concept Madison Avenue
creativity, a young woman armed with a skillet angrily smashes
an egg and then an entire kitchen to dramatize the destructiveness
326. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 528–29 (6th Cir.
2012) (Clay, J., dissenting).
327. See id. at 530 (“Although elements of the color graphics requirement may remain
constant, the underlying message that they convey will vary with the interpretation and context of
its viewer.”).
328. Id. at 529–30.
329. 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 432 (M.D.N.C. 2011), aff’d, 706 F. 3d 345 (4th Cir. 2013).
330. Id. at 432–33.
331. Id.
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of heroin. . . . [I]t sends bizarrely mixed messages. The woman
looks like Winona Ryder; she’s wearing a tight tank top; there are
no visible track marks on her junkie-thin arms; and the kitchen
representing her drug-induced hell is echt Pottery Barn, if not
Williams-Sonoma.332
If the FDA’s graphic tobacco images caused some people to consider
smoking to be a more attractive option (which, admittedly, seems unlikely),
the communications could hardly be deemed well-tailored to achieving the
government’s goals. Indeed, this seems to be the case with the abortion
ultrasound images—studies show that some women interpret these images
positively and others, negatively.333 Perhaps because the ultrasound image
communicates no singular message, research has found that exposure to
ultrasound images does not cause women to change their minds about their
abortion decision.334
Images are a form of speech subject to various interpretations
depending on who the viewer may be.335 For this reason, predicting how a
heterogeneous audience will respond when exposed to such images is
difficult (though responses to some images may be more predictable than to
others),336 and this may ultimately affect the outcome of the constitutional
analysis.337 Given the emphasis federal courts tend to place on empirical
evidence of effectiveness when deciding constitutional challenges,338 it is

332. Frank Rich, Journal; Just Say $1 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 1998),
www.nytimes.com/1998/07/15/opinion/journal-just-say-1-billion.html; see also Rebecca Cullers,
10 Anti-Drug Ads That Make You Want to Take Drugs, ADWEEK (Apr. 29, 2011, 10:31 AM),
http://www.adweek.com/adfreak/10-anti-drug-ads-make-you-want-take-drugs-131158.
333. See supra Part V.B.1.
334. See Wiebe & Adams, supra note 82, at 99 (finding that in a sample of 254 women who
chose to view their fetal ultrasound before abortion, none of the women changed their minds about
the abortion procedure).
335. See Tushnet, supra note 117, at 692 (“The apparent reality of images obscures the fact
that meaning always comes from interpretation.”).
336. See id. at 694 (“[T]here are certain features of human perception that work in predictable
ways depending on the perceptual input.”).
337. See id. at 703 (“[B]ecause images implicate First Amendment considerations, it is
important to understand whether images are meaningless or whether they have a meaning that
can’t be reduced to words. The answer determines their constitutional status, but that
determination is extremely difficult.”).
338. In the tobacco labeling cases, the decisions of the U.S. Courts of Appeal for the District
of Columbia and the Sixth Circuit were ultimately based on the strength of the evidence relating to
the effectiveness of image-based tobacco warnings in reducing smoking rates. See supra text
accompanying notes 236, 238. The courts focused on the connection (or lack thereof) between
viewers’ intentions to stop smoking and their actual behavior. See supra text accompanying notes
236–238. Both courts agreed that there was evidence to suggest that viewing the images caused
people to think about stopping smoking, but the courts generally disagreed as to whether it could
be proven, as an empirical matter, that these thoughts translated into actions. See R.J. Reynolds
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reasonable to think that campaigns communicating factual messages more
directly may be a more tailored means of achieving government goals than
campaigns communicating through indirect image-based messaging.339
3. Relevance and Undue Burden
When dealing with pre-abortion ultrasound laws in particular, there is
yet another alternative for incorporating concerns about emotional impact
into the constitutional analysis. Recall that Judge Sam Sparks of the
District Court for the Western District of Texas criticized the Fifth Circuit’s
decision to uphold Texas’s abortion ultrasound law.340 In his opinion,
Judge Sparks expressed concern that the Fifth Circuit’s broad definition of
Casey’s “reasonable regulation” requirement would permit even “an
extended presentation, consisting of graphic images of aborted fetuses, and
heartfelt testimonials about the horrors of abortion.”341
Judge Sparks’s argument that some types of emotionally persuasive
appeals may violate a woman’s Fourteenth Amendment right to
reproductive privacy is persuasive. Grounding this argument in the
definition of reasonable regulation, however, seems unsatisfactory. The
Supreme Court in Casey explicitly held that truthful and not misleading
information relevant to a woman’s abortion decision is constitutionally
permissible, even if the information has “no direct relation to her health.”342
That is, the Court expressly acknowledged that some types of information
may be relevant for the purposes of constitutional analysis despite the fact
that they are not, strictly speaking, medically relevant to a woman’s

Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (finding the evidence insufficient to
show a “direct[]” and “material decrease in smoking rates” (emphasis omitted)); Disc. Tobacco
City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 566 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding the evidence
“more than substantial” and the warnings “reasonably related to the purpose Congress sought to
achieve”); see also Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 902 (8th Cir.
2012) (relying on empirical evidence about the risk of suicidal ideation associated with abortion in
evaluating a First Amendment challenge to a compelled disclosure requirement).
339. One strong counterargument, however, is the fact that textual messages (which are often
more direct) are not typically as effective as image-based messages. Indeed, this is precisely why
the FDA chose the approach that it did. See Bennett, supra note 50, at 1925 (noting that the
FDA’s use of graphic images on tobacco packages, rather than enlarging the already present
textual warnings, was due in part to a concern that consumers either do not notice or do not
remember textual warnings). In such cases, an evaluation of the effectiveness of possible
messages might suggest that an image-based message is indeed more narrowly tailored than a
textual one or an image-based message that is less emotionally gripping. See supra Part V.B.2.
340. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, No. A-11-CA-486-SS, 2012
WL 373132, at *3 n.8 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2012).
341. Id. at *3.
342. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992) (plurality opinion).
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health.343 Indeed, federal courts’ willingness to uphold state laws requiring
that women seeking abortions be provided with information about nonmedical crisis pregnancy centers, child support, and paternity establishment
support this reading.344
Perhaps a better understanding of Judge Sparks’s concern is that
Casey’s requirements of truth and relevance are inadequate to ensure that
messages communicated during the abortion informed consent process do
not impose an “undue burden.”345 Casey defines the undue burden test as
“shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion of a nonviable fetus.”346 For a law to pass scrutiny under the
undue burden test, the means chosen by the state to further its interests
“must be calculated to inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it.”347
If we believe that free choice is rational choice, unhindered by
cognitive biases or undue pressure from third parties,348 the case could be
made that some truthful, not misleading, and relevant messages may
nevertheless have the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in
the path of a woman’s reproductive choices.
Recall that imagery and emotional triggers are often viewed as shortcircuiting the reasoning process. While the precise neurological mechanism
by which graphic imagery affects information-processing is unknown,349 the
most common layperson’s explanation seems to align with Errol Morris’s
and Richard Posner’s reasoning—that the emotional responses triggered by
343. Id.
344. See id. at 968–69 (holding that the required presentation of the availability of paternal
support and state-funded abortion alternatives was “rationally related” to a woman’s informed
choice, even though the information presented was not medically relevant to a woman’s health);
Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 584 (5th Cir. 2012)
(holding that the required presentation of paternity establishment and child support was not
constitutionally flawed).
345. See Blumenthal, supra note 75, at 36 (arguing for a broader reading of Casey that would
reject certain mandated disclosures as unduly burdensome, even if they are technically truthful
and not misleading).
346. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
347. Id.
348. See supra Part III.
349. See Karolien Poels & Siegfried Dewitte, How to Capture the Heart? Reviewing 20 Years
of Emotion Measurement in Advertising, 46 J. ADVERTISING RES. 18, 18 (2006) (“Emotional
reactions function as the gatekeeper for further cognitive and behavioral reactions.”); Feigenson &
Park, supra note 319, at 144–45 (citing evidence about emotion’s effect on informationprocessing); Forgas, supra note 319, at 599, 601 (suggesting that contemporary cognitive theories
may offer more convincing theories of how affect impacts information-processing, especially as
compared to “psychoanalytic [and] associationist explanations” and noting that “[a]ffect can
influence not only the content of people’s attitudes and judgments but also the way they go about
computing their responses.”).
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vivid imagery “‘stop us from thinking’”350 and “short-circuit[] reason.”351
Indeed, there is a large body of research to support the idea that emotionally
arousing visual messages are highly effective.352
Studies show that the brain processes images more quickly than it
processes words.353 Accordingly, images trigger viewers’ emotional
responses almost instantaneously.354
Research suggests that these
emotional responses precede cognitive or rational responses, and that
decisions affected by these emotional triggers (particularly moral
judgments) are made intuitively and automatically, long before any
reasoning or rationalization could occur.355 Recall, as noted in Part V.B.1,
that emotionally gripping visual information has been found more likely to
trigger cognitive biases and detract from rational reasoning. Moreover,
decisions made on the basis of emotions tend to be made with greater
confidence, causing people to be “less inclined . . . to process information
systematically, because they are more confident that they already know
what they need to know to address the task at hand.”356
If this research, which suggests that emotionally gripping imagery is
likely to short-cut the process of rational decisionmaking and lead to errors
in reasoning, is correct, then it may be difficult to argue that the use of
350. Tushnet, supra note 117, at 691.
351. Posner, supra note 86, at 310.
352. See, e.g., Julie L. Andsager et al., Questioning the Value of Realism: Young Adults’
Processing of Messages in Alcohol-Related Public Service Announcements and Advertising, 51 J.
COMM. 121, 121 (2001) (finding that “realistic but logic-based PSAs were not as effective as
unrealistic but enjoyable ads”); Annie Lang & Narine S. Yegiyan, Understanding the Interactive
Effects of Emotional Appeal and Claim Strength in Health Messages, 52 J. BROAD. & ELEC.
MEDIA 432, 435 (2008) (citing research concluding that “emotional messages, negative messages,
and arousing messages are more effective than nonemotional messages” (citations omitted));
Blumenthal-Barby & Burroughs, supra note 20, at 4 (citing research that emotional associations
elicited by “novel, personally relevant, or vivid examples and explanations” are more memorable
and therefore more likely to influence behavior); Farrelly et al., supra note 49, at i41, i44 (finding
that tobacco countermarketing messages that elicit strong emotional responses are more effective
and appealing to young audiences, and describing a CDC study finding that advertisements that
“‘graphically, dramatically, and emotionally portray the serious consequences of smoking’ were
the most effective”); Tushnet, supra note 117, at 696 (discussing the “unique effects vision has on
decisionmaking, effects that can’t be produced with informational pamphlets”).
353. Tushnet, supra note 117, at 691.
354. See Feigenson & Park, supra note 319, at 145 (discussing affective intuition theories);
see generally R. B. Zajonc, Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need No Inferences, 35 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 151 (1980) (demonstrating that affective, emotional judgments precede cognitive
efforts and are made with greater confidence).
355. See Zajonc, supra note 354, at 160–65 (discussing experimental and clinical evidence on
affective reactions).
356. Feigenson & Park, supra note 319, at 148. This applies to some emotions, like anger,
disgust, and happiness; however, other emotions, like hope, anxiety, and sadness, are associated
with uncertainty and greater reasoning. Id. at 147–48.
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images in the abortion context is truly aimed at informing a woman’s free
choice, as required by the Supreme Court in Casey.357 Even if an
ultrasound image is deemed to be truthful, not misleading, and relevant
under the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Casey, it may still run afoul of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s protections of reproductive privacy if its
emotional impact makes it more difficult for a woman to exercise free
choice.
4. Captive Audience Doctrine
A final option exists for incorporating arguments against emotional
persuasion into constitutional analyses of the tobacco and ultrasound laws:
the captive audience doctrine. While the First Amendment does not
explicitly recognize a “right not to listen,”358 the captive audience doctrine
does permit the state, in limited circumstances, to protect unwilling listeners
from messages communicated in ways that make them difficult or
impossible to avoid.359
This doctrine, based on privacy considerations, is quite limited in its
application, however. According to the Supreme Court, the government’s
right to “shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it”
consistent with constitutional principles is “dependent upon a showing that
substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable
manner.”360 Where individuals can simply “avert their eyes” to avoid a
message, courts have prohibited the government from intervening because
those individuals are not sufficiently “captive.”361 In contrast, case law
357. See Corbin, supra note 301, at 17 (arguing that “compelled speech that attempts to
exploit mistakes” or “intentionally exploits predictable cognitive errors” distorts public discourse).
358. See Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled Listening, 89
B.U. L. REV. 939, 943 (2009) (arguing for the recognition of a right not to listen).
359. See id. (arguing that the captive audience doctrine is a “starting point for constructing a
right against compelled listening”); Franklyn S. Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not
to Be Spoken To?, 67 NW. U. L. REV. 153, 193–95 (1972) (proposing general guidelines for how
and when the government should protect people from speech); G. Michael Taylor, “I’ll Defend to
the Death Your Right to Say It . . . But Not to Me”—The Captive Audience Corollary to the First
Amendment, 8 S. ILL. U. L.J. 211, 211–12, 226 (1983) (describing a captive audience and
proposing that the government intervene on behalf of an “unwilling listener”). According to some
authors, however, “the Court’s treatment of the captive audience doctrine has been inconsistent
and limited.” Marcy Strauss, Redefining the Captive Audience Doctrine, 19 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 85, 99 (1991).
360. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
361. See id. (suggesting that viewers encountering an offensive jacket could “avoid further
bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes”). Cf. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S.
Ct. 1207, 1219–20 (2011) (allowing protests at military funerals); Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 541–42 (1980) (rejecting restrictions on inserts placed in utility bills
mailings); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S 205, 210–12 (1975) (invalidating a law
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suggests that the government faces fewer hurdles in regulating speech to
protect individuals from audible and otherwise unavoidable messages, such
as the sound of protesters outside an abortion clinic;362 the sound of
picketing;363 or unavoidable intrusions into the home.364 In fact, an early
Supreme Court case distinguished between tobacco advertisements on
billboards and placards from those in newspapers and magazines on the
grounds that public forms of advertising (as opposed to print
advertisements) “are constantly before the eyes of observers on the streets
and in street cars to be seen without the exercise of choice or volition on
their part.”365
One might expect plaintiffs in the abortion ultrasound cases to raise
First Amendment claims based on the captive audience doctrine. To date,
however, the parties have not made such claims, and therefore the courts
have had no opportunity to consider them.366 That said, the psychological
principles highlighted above support the idea that emotionally compelling
visual messages might, even if a viewer is able to “avert his eyes,”
nevertheless run afoul of the captive audience doctrine.
Because of the way the brain processes visual and verbal messages, it
is much more difficult to avoid a visual message than a verbal one. The
brain processes graphic images more quickly than it processes words;
therefore, messages conveyed in visual terms trigger emotional responses
more quickly than textual or verbal messages.367 Further, empirical work in
social psychology demonstrates that emotionally triggering appeals—in
particular, vivid images—may have an inescapable impact on future

forbidding drive-in movie theaters from displaying films with nudity); Martin v. City of Struthers,
319 U.S. 141, 148–49 (1943) (striking down an ordinance banning door-to-door solicitation).
362. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 734 (2000) (upholding an abortion picketing
prohibition as merely empowering citizens to “prevent a speaker . . . from communicating a
message they do not wish to hear” by noting that “[p]rivate citizens have always retained the
power to decide for themselves what they wish to read, and . . . what oral messages they want to
consider”); Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 773 (1994) (upholding part of an
injunction restricting protest noises audible within an abortion clinic, but invalidating the part
restricting “images observable” from within the clinic because “it is much easier for the clinic to
pull its curtains than for a patient to stop up her ears” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
363. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 486 (1988) (upholding an ordinance banning
targeted residential picketing).
364. See, e.g., id. (calling the residential picketing in question an “especially offensive”
intrusion into the home); see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748–49 (1978)
(permitting the FCC to regulate certain types of broadcasting because broadcast media is
unavoidable to some degree); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86–87 (1949) (allowing an
ordinance that forbid the use of sound trucks in public streets).
365. Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S 105, 110 (1932).
366. See supra Part IV.A.1 and Part IV.B.
367. See supra Part V.B.1.
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choices, in part because they are more memorable and engaging.368 In
layman’s terms, it is far simpler for a listener to avoid a verbal message,
which requires increased time and energy to process, than a graphic
message. Accordingly, even if a viewer is not captive in a particular
location (such a purchaser of cigarettes at a drugstore), he might be able to
argue that the instantaneousness with which images imprint themselves on
our brains is enough to trigger the captive audience doctrine.
Consider, for example, laws requiring nutritional information on food
labels,369 or requiring that people seeking loans be presented with a stack of
paperwork describing the risks of borrowing money. 370 It is relatively
simple for a consumer to avoid these disclosures. Food labels tend to be
discreet and unobtrusive, and a borrower is free to sign loan documents
without reading them. Even patients considering medical procedures are
legally permitted to waive their right to informed consent.371 If the
consumer chooses to avoid this information, the state cannot be blamed for
the consumer’s ignorance. The graphic images associated with tobacco
labeling and ultrasound requirements, however, are different in kind. As a
matter of course, it is much easier to avoid reading words and understand
their meaning than to avoid looking at an image, even briefly, and
internalizing it.
Supporters of tobacco and ultrasound laws could argue that a smoker
need not look at the package of cigarettes she is purchasing, and that a
woman seeking an abortion can “avert her eyes” when her physician is
displaying the ultrasound.372 But these suggestions are flatly unrealistic.
When a color image composes fifty percent of the front of cigarette
packaging, it is nearly impossible for a purchaser to avoid the image. To
avoid the ultrasound image and description, a woman seeking abortion must
shut her eyes and cover her ears, much in the manner of a toddler throwing
a tantrum. It is for these reasons that a court might legitimately conclude
that image-based emotional campaigns, even where not presented in a
traditionally private sphere, violate the captive audience doctrine.
VI. CONCLUSION
Ethical arguments against the state’s use of emotion to persuade have a
long history, beginning with Aristotle and continuing through contemporary
368. See supra Part V.B.1.
369. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 343(q) (2006) (describing requirements for food labels).
370. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (2000) (dictating required disclosures for mortgage
transactions).
371. Although, of course, a physician is free to refuse to treat a patient who does so.
372. See supra note 72.
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theories of applied ethics and deliberative democracy. Recent research in
the social sciences demonstrates that visual communications (in contrast
with textual communications) are far more likely to attract attention, trigger
emotional response, and influence action. In light of these considerations, it
is perhaps surprising that policymakers at both the federal and state levels
have renewed their use of image-based health campaigns.
This Article argues that the constitutional challenges facing tobacco
and ultrasound laws can and should be bolstered by reference to these
claims from ethics and social science. While only one precedential court
opinion has found that the emotional impact of compelled imagery is
constitutionally relevant,373 an analysis of Supreme Court precedent in free
speech cases suggests that there may be reason to treat compelled imagery
differently from compelled text. Although the Court has declined, in its
prior analyses, to draw a firm line between images and text, its language in
cases dealing with obscene images and patriotic symbols seems to
recognize the unique dangers that image-based communications pose.
In evaluating the challenged tobacco and ultrasound laws, there is
reason to take into account the nature of the image-based communications
and their emotional impact on viewers. While courts addressing these
challenges have applied a variety of constitutional tests—strict scrutiny,
Zauderer, Central Hudson, and Casey—there is room within each of these
tests to incorporate arguments about the emotional impact of images.
Indeed, evidence demonstrating that various viewers interpret images
differently is surely relevant to the question of whether a compelled
communication is factual, uncontroversial, and not misleading under the
Zauderer or Casey standards. Likewise, the fact that images have been
found to be particularly likely to trigger cognitive biases suggests that
image-based campaigns may be more likely to mislead viewers than textbased campaigns.
The tailoring test used in strict scrutiny and Central Hudson analyses
takes into account whether alternate means of communication might be
more effective and impose less of a burden on speakers and listeners.
Again, the extent to which image-based campaigns might be interpreted
differently, depending on the viewer and her context, may certainly help
answer the question of whether the means used by the state to achieve its
goals is sufficiently tailored to its ends.
Casey’s test for ensuring protection of reproductive privacy asks
whether a given law imposes an undue burden on a woman’s free choice.
373. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1216–17 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(rejecting application of the Zauderer test on the grounds that the compelled images were
“inflammatory” and “unabashed attempts to evoke emotion” rather than factual statements).
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Where laws are aimed not at informing free choice, but rather are aimed at
using arational techniques to trigger an emotional response of which a
woman might not even be aware, there is a strong argument to be made that
the Casey test is violated.
Finally, the First Amendment’s captive audience doctrine, while it has
not been used in recent tobacco and ultrasound litigation, provides yet
another opportunity for incorporating concerns about the emotional impact
of imagery. Research demonstrating that images have a near instantaneous
impact on viewers in a way that text does not could be used to argue that
viewers of unwanted images are “captive” to them, even if they are not
confined to a space that has traditionally been viewed as private.
The argument presented in this Article is, of course, necessarily
limited.
The First Amendment protects citizens from government
intervention, but does not impose direct restrictions on the government’s
own speech.374 In the tobacco and ultrasound cases, it is only because the
government’s messages are filtered through an unwilling third party that we
even have the opportunity to evaluate their constitutionality. Moreover,
while government messages in the context of reproductive care are subject
to the Casey undue burden standard under the Fourteenth Amendment, no
such protections exist for government communications in other medical or
health contexts. In other words, it is a unique set of facts about the tobacco
and ultrasound cases that even permits us to judge the content and means of
these government communications. For this limited set of circumstances,
however, the argument that constitutional analyses ought to take into
account concerns about the emotional impact of images is compelling.
That said, public concerns about emotional persuasion in general, and
the emotional impact of images in particular, are broader. If we are worried
about the government’s use of emotional imagery in compelled speech
contexts, there are likewise reasons to be concerned in contexts where the
government itself is doing the speaking. Consider, for example, a recent
anti-obesity campaign by the Health Department of the City of New York,
which features a video of a man drinking a tall, refreshing glass of solid
fat.375 The video concludes with the message, “Drinking one can of soda a
day can make you ten pounds fatter a year” and an image of ten pounds of
fat dropping onto a dinner plate.376 The fact that this message is
communicated directly by the New York City Department of Health, rather
than by an unwilling third party, is simply not relevant to the viewer. Its
374. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
375. New York City Dep’t of Health, Are You Pouring on the Pounds?, YOUTUBE (Dec. 14,
2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-F4t8zL6F0c.
376. Id.
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effect on listeners—including groups of seasoned professors of health and
public health law, who groaned with disgust when shown the video at
conferences377—is the same.
For this broader set of cases, then, the constitutional constructions
described in this Article will not be dispositive. Where the government
itself is using emotionally gripping images to communicate a message,
challenges must be brought on policy grounds, rather than legal grounds.
To that end, a forthcoming article by this author offers a broader normative
framework for evaluating emotional and arational persuasion by the
government; this framework can be used by policymakers to guide their
decisions about state communications.378
In the meantime, however, the legal challenges to the tobacco and
ultrasound laws remain unresolved. The FDA has announced its intent to
develop new tobacco labeling rules that are more consistent with
constitutional principles, and opponents to state abortion ultrasound laws
continue to press their challenges in court. This Article suggests that the
emotional impact of the compelled images are relevant to their
constitutionality, and that therefore both policymakers and courts ought to
take these considerations into account when moving forward. Ultimately,
policymakers and courts will need to decide how much weight to give these
arguments—as compared to, for example, utilitarian arguments about the
effectiveness of state messaging—and it is by no means certain that the
presence of emotional imagery will have a dispositive effect in any given
context. Incorporating these ideas into the constitutional analysis, however,
is an important step for bringing contemporary constitutional jurisprudence
in line with ethical arguments and empirical evidence about the psychology
of human decisionmaking.

377. Specifically, the 2012 annual conferences of the American Society of Law, Medicine and
Ethics, as well as the American Society for Bioethics and the Humanities.
378. Sawicki, supra note 18, at 46–47.

